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Dear readers,

I am pleased at being given the opportunity to pen the forward for our fourth issue of *Humanicus*. In October 2009 I successfully defended my doctoral thesis *Resurrecting the Past: Democracy, National Identity, and Historical Memory in Modern Serbia*. In addition to finally accomplishing what had nearly been a decade long sojourn, I was honored to have been in the company of esteemed academics serving as committee readers and general editors. As many of my fellow academics know all too well, the life of a graduate student can often be long, lonely, and laborious. At times we may feel there is no end in sight in completing our projects, and the lure of reading “just one more book” before we decide to write something substantive is a constant reminder that in addition to being self-ascribed perfectionists, we are driven by an intense desire to procrastinate as strategically as possible.

Yet a new challenge quickly greets the newly crowned PhD upon emerging from his or her celebratory stupor: the search for gainful employment. As the worldwide economic recession shows nascent signs of recovery, the world of academia continues to reel from limited funding and scarce job opportunities. Universities on my side of the pond are increasingly turning towards a readily available supply of exploitable and expendable adjunct instructors to meet the growing demands of student enrollment while providing compensatory packages that hardly cover basic financial needs. This means that any real job opportunities for full-time faculty is becoming highly competitive. The stringent selection processes that are traditionally reserved for the most prestigious universities are now trickling down to second and even third tier colleges. Qualifications, while still resting on the required “PhD in hand”, are definitively expanding to include publications, and the PhD that can display an article of his or her own in an academic journal, or dare we dream a published manuscript, has a greater chance of earning that coveted position than others.

It is to *Humanicus* that I am grateful in being a part of. While we are still only in our journalistic infancy, it has significantly aided our abilities in gaining notoriety and establishing connections (an all too important facet of the academic world we tend to overlook). The ability to publish in established academic forums is still all of

our objectives, but the ability for us to make our names and disciplines known is increasingly turning to the Internet where informal networking and association continues to be an important facet of building our careers. In the spirit of academic perseverance amid these perennial challenges, I open the latest issue of our fledgling journal.

Sincerely,

Michael Rossi
Assistant to the Editor

Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ
USA

The relation of Deconstruction to Ricoeur and Levinas

Chung Chin-Yi

Abstract: In this paper I will examine the radical empiricisms of Ricoeur and Levinas. I will demonstrate that radical empiricisms translate into repetitions rather than deviations from metaphysics. Ricoeur, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty's turn to existential phenomenology and intersubjectivity represents a turn to overcome metaphysics, not unlike Heidegger, and thus repeat it by inscribing it as a negative or Jewish variant in the emphasis on Otherness and intersubjectivity in place of Being and presence. Their 'ethical turn' was a turn to privilege the Other over self and corporeality over transcendental which elides difference and the quasi-transcendental. In place of this radical empiricism or non-philosophy Derrida would argue for the importance of the quasi-transcendental as the meta-condition that grounds philosophy and non-philosophy. The difference between the transcendental and the empirical, difference, translates into a difference which is nothing. The turn towards a radical empiricism that we witness with Ricoeur, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot thus reinscribes metaphysics as a negative, which is a repetition of the transcendental as the empirical, or iterability.

Far from escaping metaphysics thus, the radical empiricisms of Ricoeur and Levinas, merely reinscribe metaphysics by repeating it as a negative, which is no different from the positive. This is because the transcendental and the empirical are paradoxically identical and non-identical, their difference translates into a sameness, nothing separates the transcendental and empirical. The empirical is but the iteration of the transcendental, just as I had previously showed the transcendental cannot exist outside the empirical. Transcendental and empirical exist only in a dynamic relation to each other through difference and iterability. As such, the transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion. In the previous chapters we have been examining the relation of deconstruction to phenomenology as defined by two

of its major proponents, Husserl and Heidegger. The deconstructive reconfiguration of phenomenology also saw some precedent in the work of Ricoeur and Levinas, whom we will now turn towards examining. Ricoeur's early engagement with Husserl saw him breaking from phenomenology as an 'egology' and solipsistic enterprise towards a definition of phenomenology as an engagement with intersubjectivity and 'otherness'. Ricoeur is interested in limiting phenomenology and defining it in terms of its concrete and existential manifestations, which he defines in *Fallible Man* as the symbolics of evil and the disproportion or discrepancy between the finite and the infinite. Ricoeur's approach to phenomenology differs from Derrida's in his interest being less in the meta-conditions of phenomenology but in seeking to define its limitations as well as to inscribe fallen-ness as a theological concept into phenomenology as its limit. The notion of limit is more prominent in the thought of Ricoeur than Derrida, who seeks not so much to examine phenomenology's limitations as define the conditions of possibility that enable phenomenology.

Ricoeur does not think the 'Other' is subordinate to the ego as the transcendental reduction performs in bracketing the world, indeed Ricoeur argues that phenomenology is premised upon 'Otherness' in allowing a definition of subjectivity to take place. Ricoeur thinks that the 'Other' is essential to determining selfhood, indeed Ricoeur takes the Other as the foundation of his phenomenology, elevating the 'Other' to something primary rather than secondary in phenomenology. Ricoeur argues that Husserl's importance was in discovering intersubjectivity as the condition of his phenomenology rather than the traditional view of Husserl's phenomenology as a Cartesian, ego-centred phenomenology. Ricoeur defines the Other as essential to determining selfhood and subjectivity in *Oneself as Another*:

Myself as flesh, before the constitution of the alter ego, is what the strategy of the intersubjective constitution of nature obliges us to think. That we owe to this impossible enterprise the formation of the ontological concept of flesh is indeed the divine surprise. As we know, the methodological decision rests in the reduction to the sphere of ownness from which would be excluded all objective predicates indebted to intersubjectivity. The flesh

would then prove to be the pole of reference of all bodies belonging to this nature (ownness).¹

Ricoeur thus argues that the objective self is predicated and premised upon the foundation of ‘Otherness’, rather than derived from what he calls a strictly Husserlian ‘egology’. Indeed he defines the ‘Other’ as the ‘pole of reference’ for the definition of own-ness, or selfhood. The ‘Other’ is the ontological foundation of the self, rather than something which is simply exterior or alien to the concept of the ego as Husserl’s phenomenological reduction would have it. Ricoeur argues further:

Let us leave aside here the derivation of the alter ego through pairing one flesh with another, let us ponder the phenomenological trait of the flesh that designates it as a paradigm for otherness. The fact that the flesh is most originally mine and of all things that which is closest, that its aptitude for feeling is revealed most characteristically in the sense of touch, as in Maine de Biran – these primordial features make it possible for flesh to be the organ of desire, the support of free movement; but one cannot say that they are the object of choice or desire. I, as this man: this is the foremost otherness of the flesh with respect to all initiative. Otherness here signifies primordially with respect to any design. Starting from this otherness, I can reign over. Primordially, however, is not a reign. Ontologically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. It can, of course, be characterized by the ‘I can’; the ‘I can’, however, does not derive from the ‘I want’ but provides a ground for it. The flesh is the place of all the passive syntheses on which the active syntheses are constructed, the latter alone deserving to be called works (*Leistungen*): the flesh is the matter (*hule*) in resonance with all that can be said to be *hule* in every object perceived, apprehended. In short, it is the origin of all ‘alteration of ownness’. From the above, it results that selfhood implies its own ‘proper’, otherness, so to speak, for which the flesh is the support. In this sense, even

¹ Ricoeur, Paul. *Oneself as another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1992. 323

if the otherness of the stranger can-by some impossibility-be derived from the sphere of ownness, the otherness of the flesh would still precede it.²

Ricoeur defines selfhood as concretely and ontologically situated as ‘the flesh’, subjectivity is embodied and corporeal as well as situated in relation to the ‘Other’. Indeed this relation to the Other is the fundamental defining trait of subjectivity, selfhood exists only in relation to the Other, it is thus dynamically constituted by this relation to the Other rather than being any simple form of ‘egology’. Ricoeur describes the ‘flesh’ as the foundation of passive synthesis upon which active synthesis is grounded, selfhood is inextricably bound up with this relation to the Other upon which it proceeds to define itself. Ricoeur argues that ‘Otherness’ is the foundation upon which the ego is premised, as he argues, ‘the otherness of the flesh would still precede it’, as the ego is derived from the Other and the Other is thus its origin rather than its subordinate as performed in the phenomenological reduction. Ricoeur further comments on Husserl’s phenomenology:

The question then arises whether Husserl’s great discovery, supported by the distinction between flesh and body, can be dissociated from what we termed its strategic role in transcendental phenomenology at the time of the *Cartesian Meditations*. I believe so. In addition to this problem, to which we shall return later, of the derivation of the status of the foreign starting from the sphere of ownness on the basis of the unparalleled passive synthesis formed by the ‘pairing’ of the ego and the alter ego, one can find in Husserl’s unpublished manuscript investigations and development on the difference (and the relation) between flesh and body, relatively independent of the problem of intersubjective constitution of nature common to all. What is said about the distinction between *here* and *there*, insofar as these are irreducible to any localization through objective points of reference, belongs pre-eminently to this phenomenological ontology of the flesh. In these texts dealing with the objective nonspatiality of the flesh, one finds an unexpected echo of Wittgenstein’s reflections on the nonbelonging of the subject to the system of his objects and on the implications of this paradox

² Ibid., 324.

concerning the notion of anchoring, which we encountered early on in the course of these studies.³

Ricoeur thus takes Husserl's most original discovery to be the discovery of intersubjectivity as well as the idea that subjectivity is fundamentally embodied- a condition which Ricoeur explores with his notion of 'the flesh'. Subjectivity is corporeal and situated in relation to an ontology rooted in Otherness rather than existing in a vacuum, as the phenomenological reduction would result in a form of solipsism and isolation of the ego, which, in existential conditions, is not a true assessment of the situation of the self according to Ricoeur. As Ricoeur argues with his point on nonbelongingness of the self as subject in a system of objects in Wittgenstein, the self is fundamentally situated in relation to the Other, it does not exist alone without definition to this existential concrete reality of the Other or in a vacuum. The spatiality of flesh is its concrete embodiment in existential terms rather than being defined as immaterial or transcendental, without corporeal definition or an existential, concrete form of tangible reality. Ricoeur goes on to define subjectivity as a fundamentally existential condition, taking his cue from Heidegger, arguing that selfhood is a thrown-ness or situatedness and a facticity, and thus an ontological reality, rather than a transcendental or immaterial substance existing without concrete or existential definition.

In his volume on Husserl, Ricoeur further argues:

Thus, the 'appresentation' of the psyche of the Other has its original reference- its *ursprungliche Vorlage*- in the solipsistic experience of a total compresence of the psychic and the physical. The unity of man is present only there, or more precisely only in tactile and affective sensations. The 'appresence' of the psyche of the Other 'in' his body is a transferred compresence. The Other senses and thinks as I do, his body too, is a psychic field, just as mine is an originary sensorial field. But the range of action of this transfer is boundless. All compresence is transmuted into empathy: the hand of the Other that I see 'appresents to me' the solipsistic touching of that hand and all that goes along with this touching. A whole

³ Ibid, 324-325

world is born to this hand, a world that I can only ‘presentiate’ ‘render’ present to myself, without its being present to me. Thus, bit by bit, an art of signs is formed, a vast grammar of expressions of which the most notable illustration is language. To understand these signs is to constitute man, to apprehend the Other as ‘analogue of myself’.⁴

Ricoeur thus argues that phenomenology up to Husserl has been solipsistic and that the Other is an ‘analogue of myself’, the Other constitutes the self, as Ricoeur argues, the brain is always the brain of another. Ricoeur argues that Husserl’s original discovery is the discovery of intersubjectivity and that this idea of the self being relational and constituted by the Other is fundamental rather than marginal to phenomenology. The Other is not reducible as it is the fundamental relational entity upon which the self is premised. The self can only be defined in relation to the Other. It does not exist as an ipseity or a solipsistic and solitary entity as Husserl’s Cartesian inclinations would have it. Ricoeur thus premises his ontology and phenomenology upon the Other. Derrida, in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, will argue that this flight towards the Other is a characteristic of Jewish philosophy. Derrida does not privilege the Other in his phenomenology, but examines the aporia and differance between presence and absence which enables phenomenology. The notion of the quasi-transcendental, or the differance between transcendental and empirical, or philosophy and non-philosophy, which enables phenomenology, is Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology. Derrida does not think that Ricoeur’s existential phenomenology manages to escape metaphysics as it is a Jewish and negative repetition of metaphysics which its emphasis on ‘Otherness’ and intersubjectivity in place of Being and presence. As argued above, the radical empiricism of Ricoeur and his turn to privilege the Other over the Same, merely inscribes metaphysics as a negative and thus does not overcome metaphysics as the transcendental and the empirical are the same, as argued in the Husserl chapters. The movement of the trace institutes the difference between the transcendental and empirical as a non-difference, or a sameness. By seeking so rigorously to elevate the Other over the Same Ricoeur merely repeats metaphysics as differance or the trace

⁴ Ricoeur, Paul. *Husserl: an analysis of his phenomenology*. Translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967. 65-66

determines the difference between the transcendental and empirical as a difference which is nothing and separates nothing. The transcendental exists only through the empirical in the dynamic relation of iterability, and hence an empirical idealism like Ricoeur's which negates the transcendental lands phenomenology in an aporia, in a manner similar to the way the transcendental reduction lands phenomenology in an aporia, because it simply reverses the effects of the transcendental reduction. The difference which separates the transcendental and empirical is a difference which is nothing, or difference, and hence Ricoeur's turn to radical empiricism repeats metaphysics because the transcendental and empirical are separated by nothing, difference, and are the same. The transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion, as demonstrated in the chapters on Husserl; hence empirical idealism is a repetition of transcendental idealism rather than a deviation from it. Derrida thus differs from Ricoeur in not performing philosophical anthropology or existential philosophy but examining the meta-conditions which allow phenomenology to take place, naming these as difference and iterability. The transcendental and empirical are related in a paradoxical relation of simultaneous identity and non-identity, because their difference translates into a sameness and non-distinction, hence the quasi-transcendental is a paradoxical distinction that is a non-distinction and thus aporetic rather than immanent, inclusive, or contaminating as previous critics have argued. Rather than privilege an empirical idealism or subvert transcendental idealism like Ricoeur, Derrida locates the space of truth as quasi-transcendental, neither transcendental nor empirical but the limit, spacing and interval between them that allows the thinking of both through the differentiating movement of difference and the trace.

In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur attempts to bring an affective dimension to phenomenology in examining the reality of misery as a human condition, as well as to define man as essentially fallen and capable of evil, which paradoxically also enables man's capacity for good. In *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur defines the relation between the finite and infinite as one of disproportion and discrepancy. Ricoeur is thus interested in the limits of man and a theological notion of evil which had not been written into phenomenology prior to Ricoeur as phenomenology had been largely a-theological and without a concept of man's fallen-ness or sin. Phenomenology according to Husserl had been defined as transcendental; according to Ricoeur such a reading elides man's fallen nature and capacity for evil

as the transcendental had been defined according to Kant as the basis for man's capacity for virtue and reason, even grounding his metaphysics of morals in it. Ricoeur examines the limitations of phenomenology defined according to a transcendental framework as he argues that there is a disproportion or discrepancy between the finite and infinite, man thus is fallen and inadequate to the infinite because he is circumscribed by his finitude and flawed nature which Ricoeur writes into his phenomenology as a symbolics of evil. Ricoeur is interested in the interweaving and inextricability of the finite and infinite as infinity can only find expression in finitude. This he explores in his notion of synthesis. Derrida also explores this contamination of the transcendental and empirical, but where Derrida is interested in the phenomenon of mediation and the enabling conditions of transcendental genesis Ricoeur is more interested in reducing the portrait of man as infallible and good.

Ricoeur highlights fallibility as a theological concept much more than Derrida, who is interested not so much in a theological conception of man as the meta-conditions which enable metaphysical thinking. Where Ricoeur emphasizes the intertwining of good and evil in man to highlight the essential theological condition of man as Christian, Derrida's expansion of Husserl's notion of *Verflechtung* or the interweaving of the transcendental and empirical is an examination of iterability, or repetition, as the condition of possibility of metaphysics. Ricoeur is interested in the discrepancy between the finite and infinite while Derrida is more interested in the aporia that enables the instantiation of the transcendental as iterability or repetition with a difference. Derrida has less interest in the incommensurability of the finite to the infinite than the enabling condition of the transcendental and empirical as the movement of the trace or difference. Essentially, Derrida's difference differs from Ricoeur's fallibility in terms of the theological and Christian import of Ricoeur's interest in fallen-ness and sin and Derrida's more meta-phenomenological concerns in the movement of difference and the trace as the enabling condition of metaphysical thought. The movement of the trace, or difference, distinguishes nothing and separates nothing, hence in place of an incommensurability or disproportion as Ricoeur argues, Derrida would argue that the transcendental and empirical are the same. Nothing separates the transcendental and empirical as the transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. Ricoeur brings to bear a notion of synthesis that allows the expression of

the infinite in the finite. This notion of synthesis however, is to be distinguished from Derrida's notion of iterability and mediation.

Where Ricoeur argues for an interweaving of the finite and infinite because man's capacity for evil paradoxically is also his capacity for good; Derrida is interested in the meta-phenomenological conditions which allow metaphysical structures to come into being. Their difference of interest is thus on the one hand, theological definitions of phenomenology as a description of man's fundamentally Christian condition and meta-phenomenological definitions of differance and iterability as the conditions of possibility for metaphysics. Ricoeur's disproportion also differs from Derrida's differance, in that Ricoeur is interested in describing man's limits and fallibility, while Derrida is interested in the meta-conditions that allow phenomenological structures to play out in the first place. Ricoeur further argues on disproportion:

The 'disproportion' between sense and perspective, between intending and looking, between the verb and point of view, is as the melodic germ of all the variations and all the developments that culminate in the 'disproportion' between happiness and character. This 'disproportion', we remember, vouched for itself in the simple fact of reflection. Man's finitude, we said, is such that it can be known and expressed; and it can be expressed only because speaking itself is already a transgression of point of view and finite perspective. However, that 'disproportion' between speaking and perspective was still only the theoretical aspect of human disproportion. What we are trying to express now is the global character of disproportion.⁵

As we can see from the above paragraphs, Ricoeur is interested in limiting the concept of the good and the infinite in phenomenology in his emphasis on disproportion and discrepancy between the finite and the infinite. Ricoeur is also interested in the notion of synthesis; happiness is not an abstraction or a finite concept but an interweaving of the two because it is affective and existentially manifested. Ricoeur's difference from Derrida is thus in his interest as well in the affective aspects of phenomenology, in concrete existential manifestations of

⁵ Ricoeur, Paul. *Fallible Man*. New York : Fordham University Press, 1986, 64 -65

phenomenology in emotions such as happiness and misery, taking his cue perhaps from Heidegger's notions of moods such as boredom and anxiety. To examine Ricoeur further on his notion of disproportion:

All human action bears the mark of this indefiniteness. Upsets the structure of acts at the vital level, acts characterized by a cycle of lack or avoidance, of pain, of initiating something, of attainment, of pleasure or pain. The criteria of 'satiety' alone would allow us to give a strict meaning to the idea of affective regulation; but these criteria can no longer be applied. 'Satiety' would be reached if all tensions could be totally saturated. But action, insofar as it unfolds at the beck of the three fundamental quests of self-being, is in principle a perpetual movement. The Thomist and Cartesian description of the love-desire-pleasure cycle becomes unusable. Extending this cycle or introducing delays into it is no longer sufficient; it is necessary to open it up. No action is any longer terminal, all actions have become strangely intermediary.⁶

In the above passage Ricoeur introduces a further notion of indefiniteness, the self is essentially not determinate and constantly becoming or in the process of definition. This notion of 'becoming' is quite existential and is also explored by Sartre who argues that being is a nothingness, there is no essential self, the self is constantly in a process of definition. Derrida will differ from this opinion in by no means being an existential phenomenologist but a phenomenologist who performs meta-phenomenology in examining aporia as the condition that defines phenomenology, the transcendental-empirical relation is one of paradox and repetition rather than any existential or anthropologicistic return to the realm of Being. Derrida would find Ricoeur's phenomenology anthropologicistic, as he found Heidegger's. Derrida demonstrates that non-being is as essential to determining Being as presence and the transcendental, because the transcendental is constituted by differance and iterability. The transcendental and empirical are related by the trace which institutes their difference as a paradoxical sameness. The impossibility of the distinction between Ricoeur's empiricism and Husserl's idealism is its own

⁶ Ibid., 125-126

possibility as empirical idealism and transcendental idealism are the same, separated by differance, a difference that is not a difference, rather than mutually exclusive. It is the aporia between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both as the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical, their distinction translates into a non-distinction or a sameness.

In this section I have examined Ricoeur's phenomenology and its points of divergence with Derrida's. Ricoeur developed phenomenology in a theological direction and directed phenomenology's emphasis towards intersubjectivity and an examination of how Otherness is constitutive of the self and the fundamental unit of phenomenology rather than ipseity or the ego. As I have argued in the above section, Derrida differs from this emphasis on Otherness in his discovery of the quasi-transcendental, or the differance between the transcendental and empirical which enables phenomenology. Derrida thus performs a meta-phenomenology in place of Ricoeur's existential phenomenology and philosophical anthropology.

Levinas and the overcoming of ontology towards a metaphysics of transcendence

Levinas, like Ricoeur, directed phenomenology towards an overcoming of essentialist conceptions of being and towards the Other. Levinas calls this the overcoming of ontology towards metaphysics, his movement is a flight away from the totality of Being towards embracing the infinity of the Other, as the Other exerts a demand and responsibility upon being, indeed, the Other holds one hostage and exerts an ethical demand upon one to be responsible to the Other, thus limiting one's freedom. Like Ricoeur Levinas critiques an ontology of ipseity, the Same, and essence, directing phenomenology towards Otherness and a transcendence of Being towards embracing the Other as the exteriority which defines and limits Being. As I have mentioned in the previous section on Ricoeur, this flight towards Otherness is a repetition of metaphysics in a Jewish rather than Greek sense according to Derrida in 'Violence and metaphysics'; Derrida seeks to trace the conditions of possibility of phenomenology as the trace or differance between Jew and Greek, presence and absence, everything and nothing. According to Derrida, God and history is written in this play between presence and absence, transcendental and

empirical, it is difference which is the meta-condition determining presence rather than what Ricoeur and Levinas embrace as an anti-essentialist and Other-directed phenomenology. Levinas writes in a Jewish idiom with his ethics for the Other in mind, with phrases such as ‘neighbour’ and the ‘infinity’ of the Other, as well as ‘care’ and ‘responsibility’; it is a Jewish ethics of care and compassion for the Other, in Judaeo-Christian religious ethics of loving the neighbour as oneself that is being elaborated by Levinas. Levinas is primarily concerned with moral agency as set out by a Judaeo-Christian framework in raising the Other to absolute as a site of transcendence and infinity. At the foundation of his concerns on ‘responsibility’ and ‘justice’ are a definition of an ethical relation to the Other which has the holocaust in mind, Levinas’ ethics are defined in relation to the horrors of the holocaust and are an imperative for an ethics which takes Jewish alterity as the ‘Other’ in account.

Totality and Infinity

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas describes the fundamental unit of phenomenology as the face of the Other. The face of the Other is naked and destitute, thus exerting a strong demand on one towards responsibility for the Other. Self is defined according to a countenance of the face of the Other, who exerts a burden of responsibility upon one and a demand for transcendence of Being and selfhood towards the infinity of the Other, as the self becomes circumscribed, defined and limited by this relation towards the Other. Levinas contrasts the totality of the self and Being with the infinity of the Other, the other is a site of transcendence as one goes beyond the bounds of ego to relate to the Other in a transcendent ethical relation with alterity and difference. The Other as exterior to Being exerts a demand and call upon one’s existence towards responsibility for the Other. Reading from Levinas on the shift from ontology to metaphysics:

But theory understood as a respect for exteriority delineates another structure essential for metaphysics. In its comprehension of being (or ontology) it is concerned with critique. It discovers the dogmatism and the naïve arbitrariness of its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology; it then seeks to exercise this freedom in such a way

as to turn back at every moment to the origin of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free exercise. This would lead to an infinite regression if this return itself remained an ontological movement, an exercise of freedom, a theory. Its critical intention then leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same- which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same- is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology.⁷

Levinas argues that ontology reduces the Other to the same, and thus renounces metaphysical desire. This metaphysical desire is the desire for transcendence of the self towards the exteriority of the Other which exerts a limit on it and thus curtails one's freedom, because it exerts the burden of responsibility upon one. This relation, a calling by the Other to responsibility upon the self – Levinas calls an ethical relation. Levinas argues that this transcendence towards the infinity of the Other in an ethical relation is a more accurate portrayal of existential circumstances than the ipseity of ontology. Yet this reversal of the reduction of the Other to the Same is but a repetition of metaphysics rather than a deviation from it. Levinas' radical empiricism is no different from transcendental idealism because the transcendental and empirical are the same, nothing separates the transcendental and empirical, as argued in the Husserl chapters. The transcendental and empirical are related in paradoxical identity in non-identity, sameness in difference, as nothing separates the transcendental and empirical. The movement of the trace relates the transcendental and the empirical in a paradoxical institution of a difference which is

⁷ Levinas, Emmaneul. *Totality and infinity : an essay on exteriority*. The Hague ; Boston : M. Nijhoff Publishers ; Hingham, MA : distribution for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Boston, 1979. 42-43

a sameness. Transcendental and empirical are thus repetitions of the same through iterability. The transcendental does not exist outside the empirical, nothing separates the transcendental and empirical. As argued in the Husserl chapters, the transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion. Further Levinas argues:

The 'egoism' of ontology is maintained even when, denouncing Socratic philosophy as already forgetful of Being and already on the way to the notion of the 'subject' and technological power, Heidegger finds in Presocratism thought as obedience to the truth of Being. This disobedience would be accomplished in existing as builder and cultivator, effecting the unity of the site which sustains space. In bringing together presence on the earth under the firmament of the heavens, the waiting for the gods and the company of mortals in the presence to the things- which is to build and to cultivate- Heidegger, with the whole of Western history, takes the relation with the Other as enacted in the destiny of sedentary peoples, the possessors and builders of the earth. Possession is pre-eminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine. In denouncing the sovereignty of the technological powers of man Heidegger exalts the pre-technological powers of possession. His analyses do not start with the thing-object, to be sure, but they bear the mark of the great landscapes to which the things refer. Ontology becomes ontology of nature, impersonal fecundity, faceless generous mother, matrix of particular beings, inexhaustible matter for things.⁸

In the above passage, Levinas describes ontology as 'egoism', an emphasis on ipseity, and like Ricoeur, argues that ontology presupposes metaphysics. The self can only be defined in relation to the Other, selfhood does not exist without the Other as an interlocutor, Levinas describes the relationship with the Other as the ultimate relation in Being. Levinas argues that comprehension of Being cannot dominate the relationship with the Other, the Other is not subordinate to the ego but essential to defining selfhood, indeed selfhood is defined by an existential confrontation with the Other as interlocutor. Levinas is concerned to reverse Heideggerean ontology

⁸ Ibid., 46-48

which is an ontology of power with its emphasis on Being. Levinas argues that ontology reduces the Other to the same, where this Other is an irreducible unit of phenomenology which must be taken into account. As argued above, a reversal of Heideggerean ontology presupposes the separation of the transcendental and empirical, which is not possible, because these are related in a dynamic relation of iterability and difference. The trace, which separates the transcendental and empirical, paradoxically institutes this difference as sameness. The transcendental and empirical are thus simultaneously identical and non-identical, distinguished by nothing and thus the distinction translates into sameness. A reversal of Heideggerean ontology thus repeats it rather than overcoming it in any sense.

Levinas describes Heideggerean ontology as an essence murderous of the Other, ontology has occluded the Other with a violence of suppression, while Levinas describes phenomenology as ethical and defined only in relation to this irreducible Other. As Levinas argues, ontology presupposes metaphysics. Otherness is the fundamental unit of ontology rather than the ego and the same, because a phenomenology of egoism reduces the Other where this Other is an irreducible unit of phenomenology because subjectivity is only defined in existential confrontation with the Other as interlocutor. Levinas further defines his ethical phenomenology in relation to Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology of subjectivity and egoism when he reinforces his idea of phenomenology as intersubjectivity and an engagement with the Other as that which defines subjectivity. The Other is the horizon upon which Being and the self is defined. It is the limit of the self and the fundamental phenomenological unit upon which the self is premised, as the Other exerts a call upon one to responsibility and is an interlocutor of one's existence. Levinas describes this as a veritable inversion objectifying cognition, the Other is irreducible to cognition, and is the fundamental unit of ontology rather than something reducible or subordinate to the ego as previously defined by Heidegger and Husserl. This move to privilege Otherness is a radical empiricism that repeats metaphysics rather than escaping it, as empirical is no different from the transcendental, existing in a relation of iterability, and repetition with a difference; rather than an ontological separation from each other. The empirical is not separable from the transcendental as the a priori difference which separates the transcendental and empirical translates into a difference which is nothing. Radical empiricism thus repeats metaphysics rather than escaping from it. As discovered in

the Husserl chapters, transcendental empirical difference is an illusion; truth is neither transcendental nor empirical, but quasi-transcendental, the interval between the transcendental and empirical that conditions the thinking and production of both.

Otherwise than Being, or beyond essence

In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas further defines his ethics of alterity and otherness:

The infinite orders to me the neighbour as a face, without being exposed to me, and does so the more imperiously that proximity narrows. The order has not been the cause of my response, nor even a question that would have preceded it in a dialogue. I find the order in my response itself, which, as a sign given to the neighbour, as a 'here I am', brings me out of invisibility, out of the shadow in which my responsibility could have been evaded. This saying belongs to the very glory of which it bears witness.⁹

Levinas describes the face of the other as the fundamental unit of phenomenology which commands one into existence. It exerts an ethical demand upon one and calls one to responsibility for the Other. Levinas describes it as a trace of a wandering cause, inscribed in the self. According to Levinas thus, the relation to the Other is not secondary but primary as it calls being into existence, it is a command to respond with responsibility and an ethical relation. Further Levinas argues:

Consciousness is born as the presence of a third party. It is in the measure that it proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face to face. The concern for justice, for the thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on the said, from the bottom of the saying without the said, the saying as contact, is the spirit in society. And it is because the third party does not

⁹ Levinas, Emmanuel. *Otherwise than being : or, Beyond essence*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Hague ; Boston : M. Nijhoff ; Hingham, MA. 150.

come empirically to trouble proximity, but the face is both the neighbour and the face of faces, visage and the visible, that, between the order of being and of proximity the bond is unexceptional. Order, appearing, phenomenality, being are produced in signification, in proximity, starting with the third party. The apparition of a third party is the very origin of appearing, that is, the very origin of an origin.

The foundation of consciousness is justice. Not that justice makes a pre-existing meditation intervene. An event like meditation- synchronization, comparison, thematization- is the work of justice, an entry of the diachrony of proximity, of the signifyingness of saying into the synchrony of the said, a 'fundamental historicity' in the sense of Merleau-Ponty.¹⁰

As Levinas argues, the Other calls the self into existence, consciousness is only born as the presence of the third party. Phenomenology is an account of this third party and the Other as the fundamental unit which calls the self into existence through existential confrontation and a demand for responsibility. The Other is an infinity which commands one out of solipsism into existence, selfhood does not exist in a vacuum but in an ethical relation to the Other as a neighbour. Phenomenology is thus an account of this ethical relation to the Other as justice. Subjectivity comes with duties and responsibilities because of the ethical demand and burden that the Other exerts upon one, the self does not exist desituated in a concept of a non-reciprocal relationship with the Other but in a situated context of reciprocity and existential as well as ethical relationship with the Other. Levinas' existential phenomenology is thus fundamentally concerned with ethics, justice and the burden of responsibility that the Other exerts upon the self. As argued above, this radical empiricism in the flight towards the Other repeats metaphysics as the empirical is no different from the transcendental. The trace, which separates the transcendental and empirical, translates into a difference which distinguishes nothing and separates nothing. Transcendental and empirical are thus paradoxically identical in their non-identity, and an empirical idealism thus is not a divergence from transcendental idealism but a repetition of it. As argued previously in the Husserl chapters,

¹⁰ Ibid., 160-161

transcendental-empirical difference is really an illusion as they are repetitions of the same.

Violence and Metaphysics

Derrida argues that Heidegger's ontotheology has been blind to the Other in being a form of 'egology' and 'egoism' as Being is an anthropomorphic appeal to subjectivity and humanism. Derrida argues that the thought of Being neutralizes the Other as Being: "Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power." (II, p. 36), a philosophy of the neutral, the tyranny of the state as an anonymous and inhuman universality.¹¹

On Derrida's reading, Levinas's ethical metaphysics is an empiricism whose basic unit is the face of the other person. Understood in this way, Levinasian metaphysics is a 'return to the things themselves'¹², a new philosophy undermines phenomenology and ontology. However, the transgression of phenomenology and ontology that is brought about by Levinas's empirical metaphysics in fact presupposes the very things that it seeks to transgress. Derrida claims that Levinas's overcoming of transcendental phenomenology presupposes that which it seeks to overcome (It is difficult to see how...Levinas can separate himself from Husserl)¹³.

Derrida applies the same thinking with Levinas's relation to Heidegger. Although Derrida affirms Levinas's need to depart from Heidegger's thinking (In question here is a need whose natural legitimacy we would be the last to contest¹⁴), he claims that Levinasian ethico-metaphysical transcendence presupposes fundamental ontological transcendence, and that "Levinas confirms Heidegger in his purpose"¹⁵. Levinas does not manage to transcend Heidegger as he sets out to do. A philosophy of alterity is no different from ontology although it claims to depart from it as ethical-metaphysical transcendence presupposes ontological transcendence.

¹¹ Derrida, Jacques. *Writing and Difference*. Trans. Alan Bass: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, 120

¹² Ibid., 107-8

¹³ Ibid., 121

¹⁴ Ibid., 145

¹⁵ Ibid., 142

Derrida defines Levinas' metaphysics as a Jewish metaphysics rather than a Greek metaphysics which had privileged light and being, while Derrida argues that metaphysics is actually the difference or difference between Jew and Greek, presence and absence, everything and nothing. Phenomenology is enabled by the quasi-transcendental, or the interval between transcendental and empirical, presence and absence, as we have discussed in previous chapters, this difference is paradoxically a sameness because it distinguished nothing and separates nothing. Derrida thus demonstrates that Levinas' phenomenology translates as a repetition of metaphysics rather than an escape from it, not unlike Heidegger's repetition in his attempt to overcome metaphysics. Reading from Derrida:

This complicity between empiricism and metaphysics is in no way surprising. By criticizing them, or rather by limiting them with one and the same gesture, Kant and Husserl indeed had recognized their solidarity. It calls for closer meditation. Schelling went quite far in this direction.¹⁶

Derrida thus describes the relationship between empiricism and metaphysics as complicity rather than inversion or negation as Levinas would have it. Derrida describes the relation as an economy and solidarity rather than one of exclusion and negation, so Levinas does not, in his radical empiricism, manage to escape metaphysics. Further Derrida argues:

Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history. We live in and of difference, that is, in hypocrisy, about which Levinas so profoundly says that it is 'not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world attached to both the philosophers and the prophets.' (II,p. 24)¹⁷

Derrida thus argues that there is no difference between Levinas' non-philosophy and philosophy as there exists a complicity between the Jew and the Greek, truth is

¹⁶ Ibid., 190

¹⁷ Ibid., .190 -192

to be situated between Jew and Greek, truth is neither Jew nor Greek metaphysics but quasi-transcendental, or the difference and difference between Jew and Greek. Jew and Greek thought are not negations but repetitions of each other, they are the same and not negations or inversions of each other. Truth is quasi-transcendental and the difference or difference between Jew and Greek rather than either strictly Jew or Greek. Derrida would also demonstrate, as I have outlined above in the section on Ricoeur, that Levinas' turn to radical empiricism is a repetition of metaphysics as the transcendental and the empirical are the same, the movement of iterability relates the transcendental and empirical as repetitions of the same, rather than ontologically separable phenomena.

In 'Phenomenology, Ontology, Metaphysics', Derrida argues that Levinas' notion of metaphysics has been informed by a need to overcome the 'egology', 'sameness' and 'being' of ontology which has confined metaphysics to a totality and interiority which is blind to the infinity and exteriority of the Other which exerts an ethical demand on one towards transcendence, thus transforming metaphysics and ontology into ethics through embracing the infinity of the Other. As Derrida argues, desire permits itself to be appealed to the absolute exteriority of the other to which it must remain infinitely inadequate.¹⁸ For Derrida, desire is excess and thus cannot be confined to the solipsistic ontology of being, desire is always a flight to transcend totality towards the infinity of the Other. This makes the metaphysics of desire a metaphysics of infinite separation. The flight towards the Other is a transcendence of the solipsism, ipseity and egology of the self, thus separating the self from itself to embrace the Other in the ethical demand that the Other exerts on One. As Derrida interprets this separation, this transcendence and infinite separation from the self is not unhappy consciousness but opening and freedom. As Derrida argues, the ego confines ontology to a metaphysics of the Same. On Levinas' interpretation, transcendence towards the Other, overcoming ontology of ipseity and sameness towards the infinity of the Other is what truly constitutes metaphysics by defining it as ethical. History has blinded the ego to the Other according to Levinas by confining it to Sameness, solipsism and ipseity. Derrida however makes the qualification that one accepts this expansion of ontology into metaphysics of exteriority and ethics if one accepts Levinas' equation of the ego and

¹⁸ Ibid., 115

the Same. Were one to resist the idea that resistance to the same is not real but intelligible as intelligible resistance, one would not follow Levinas on his arguments about metaphysics being a prioritization of the Same and ipseity.

Derrida thus defines the confrontation with the absolutely Other as something which exceeds the confines of the concept relationship as it is not a representation, limitation nor a conceptual relation to the same. It is an encounter which resists conceptualization, resistant to all categories, something which exceeds the bounds of conceptualization or categorization or the notion of horizon, which limits one to the horizon of the same and unity over heterogeneity. In a move which anticipates Derrida's own, Levinas locates the encounter in a future and beyond that is present not in ontology, presence, ipseity or horizons but the trace, present at the heart of experience. It is thus a non-presence which determines presence, the trace of the Other in which one encounters its infinity and beyond exists at the heart of presence as a non-presence or dislocation of presence rather than something which can be determined within its horizon. The encounter of the Other is an ethical relation which is religious, encompassing the religiosity of the religious, not achieved by an intuition of a positive presence, but as a prayer addressed to freedom or a commandment. The face of the Other is accusative, it calls one out of indifference into an ethical relation of respect and responsibility, into a non-violent relation of seeing and recognition for the Other as other and not a subsumption under the conceptual category of the Same.

Levinas' restitution of metaphysics thus radicalizes and systematizes previous reductions of phenomenology and ontology by opening up metaphysics towards seeing the Other as Other and infinite in its beyond, grasping the Other not as a concept or totality which reduces it to the same but as a trace. This confrontation is deeply religious and commands the self into a recognition for the Other as an infinite beyond, irreducible to the self or sameness. This confrontation with the Other frees metaphysics from the light of Being, or its Greek conceptualization of metaphysics towards a Judaic conceptualization of metaphysics which adopts the ethical relation towards the Other as the fundamental unit of metaphysics. Yet Derrida will demonstrate that this Jewish variant on metaphysics presupposes its Greek form because it assumes it as a point of departure, radicalization, inversion and negation and thus does not free itself completely from its metaphysical vocabulary. Derrida then goes on to interpret Heideggerian

ontology as an 'egology', which neutralizes the Other of Being into the same, ontology is a philosophy of power which negates and refuses to accommodate the existence of the Other. Heideggerean possibilities thus remain powers, oppressive and possessive. Yet Levinas' alternative in rejecting idealism and subjectivity is doomed to repeat it by negating Logos and thus paradoxically affirming the structurality of structure in affirming logocentrism through his denunciations of a center, the non-philosophy of Levinas remains logocentric as it affirms the non-centre as centre and thus reinscribes the structurality of structure by deviating, and hence simultaneously affirming the presence of a centre. Derrida eventually affirms that both philosophy and non-philosophy end up being logocentric in affirming or deviating from the presence or absence of a centre, and rather than choosing between philosophy and non-philosophy truth is rather quasi-transcendental and the difference between Jew and Greek, in which God and history are written and inscribed, unfolding between presence and absence as the play which constitutes the world. Derrida thus demonstrates the difference between Jew and Greek translates paradoxically as a sameness, Jew and Greek are repetitions rather than deviations and hence since this transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is the difference between these two extremes.

The fundamental unit of Levinas' metaphysics, the face, is a unit which exceeds conceptualization and categorization as well. It is not a metaphor or a figure, but a fundamental expression which calls one into existence through exerting a command on one into responsibility and ethical obligation to the Other. This Other is irreducible, not conceptualizable, calling one into existence and ethical obligation through its expression as a command of one into existence in relation to the Other. Derrida then proceeds to argue that a world which recognizes the face, in which there is a true seeing and apprehension of the irreducibility of Other as Other, there would be no war. Yet the world as it exists is a world where there is no longer a face as war clearly exists, yet the world without a face is also a world without a cause for war as it is a world without the Other which one has a confrontational relationship with. It follows that with, or without God, who guarantees the existence of a face, there is war and thus God becomes implicated in war. War supposes and excludes God because God should guarantee the face as acknowledgement of the Other so no war would ensue, and yet clearly in this world there is no acknowledgement of the face and thus an exclusion of God. Hence

because war exists, war is the difference between the face and the finite world without a face. The reality is that God exists in the play between this presence and absence of a face, the world as it exists is a play between a world with a face and a world without a face and hence war and peace erupt and exist simultaneously. God exists as the play between the presence and absence of a face. God is thus the play, and difference between the world with a face and the finite world without a face. God exists in the play between presence and absence rather than as a strict presence to the world as God is difference, written in the play between everything and nothing, presence and absence, in which history unfolds. The face of God disappears forever in showing itself because it is not meant to be countenanced as a sacred and divine component of the transcendental beyond. The face is thus neither the face of God nor the figure of man but their resemblance. The Other resembles God but is not God, the Other is the resemblance between humanity and God.

Derrida argues that God is not infinitely Other as a positive infinity, but in a relational sense, through difference. As Derrida sees it, the Other cannot be infinitely Other except through finitude and mortality. Transcendental has to be mediated through empirical in a relationship of iterability and difference. God is not an either All or Nothing, Life and Death but named in the difference or difference between these terms, God is inscribed in this difference which we term history. Derrida then argues that Levinas is not a thinker of difference or the quasi-transcendental but inversion of metaphysics or radical empiricism, which is a negative theology that repeats metaphysics rather than departing in any meaningful sense from it. Differing from Levinas, Derrida demonstrates that metaphysics is economy rather than alterity. Metaphysics is the difference between Jew and Greek, presence and absence, all or nothing, unfolding between these limits as history and inscribed as God rather than a choice of either totality or infinity as Levinas would have it. While Levinas would argue that presence is violence and the meaning of finitude, Derrida asks why we should choose finitude and history or radical empiricism over Greek metaphysics of light, power and oppression as Levinas has defined the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida argues it is not a matter of choosing between Greek conceptualizations of metaphysics or Jewish conceptions of metaphysics but seeing truth as quasi-transcendental and the difference between these two extremes. There exists complicity rather than difference between philosophy and non-philosophy. Non-philosophy is really a

repetition of philosophy and truth is rather not a choice between philosophy or non-philosophy but the difference and difference between the two.

In his later commentary on Husserl in *Rogues*, Derrida affirms two principles that his critique of Husserl's phenomenology from *Speech and Phenomena* and *Introduction to Origin of Geometry* had outlined. Firstly, Derrida had argued for the impossibility of pure Presence due to the necessity of temporalization. The two evils of rationalism named by Husserl in his *Crises of the European Sciences*, irrationalism and objectivist naivete, nonetheless are bound to the myth of reason as a certain presence. In *Rogues*, as Derrida has argued previously in *Speech and Phenomena*, the present is produced only by altering and dissimulating itself. Presence has to be temporalized and made simultaneous with non-presences in the forms of past and future in order to be communicated, the transcendental has to be repeated with a difference and relayed through difference in order to be communicated, and hence pure Presence as Husserl posits as the solution to grounding the sciences in an Absolute Present of transcendental idealism is a myth. Derrida argues that because Husserl has identified the two fallacies of reason, irrationalism and objectivist naivete, it is not a crises that cannot be overcome. Derrida would argue that Husserl has located the aporia of phenomenology, in reifying itself into two extremes of irrationalism and objectivism, truth is to be located as quasi-transcendental and the difference between these two extremes rather than a return to privilege presence and transcendental idealism as Husserl does. Derrida thus affirms at the end of his career that Husserl had discovered the fundamental aporia of phenomenology- that the two extremes of rationalistic fallacy- irrationalism and objectivist naivete were dead ends and the solution to overcoming fallacy was acknowledging impasse, paradox and the quasi-transcendental. Derrida argues that the crises is resolvable by acknowledging it is not a matter of choosing one extreme over the other but acknowledging paradox and aporia as truth. To cite Derrida,

“If this crisis remains ambiguous, if this double critique calls into question a certain rationalism and a certain irrationalism, the only possible conclusion is that the crisis can be overcome. It is not an irreversible failure. The failure of which we are speaking, if it indeed fails or goes aground (the event of an accidental running aground or the event of an intentional grounding, linked, therefore, to some freedom or transcendental evil), fails only in appearance

and indicates only an apparent failure of rationalism. An apparent failure of rationalism- that is precisely Husserl's conclusion. If it is going to inspire a call to save the honor of reason (Husserl wants no such rescue) but to endure a heroism of reason, which, I think you will grant me, is not too far away."¹⁹

Reason can thus be saved by acknowledging the failure of reason is only apparent, it is resolvable by acknowledging aporia rather than committing to transcendental evil or freedom. Truth is quasi-transcendental, neither materialist or transcendental, but the space between that conditions the thinking of both.

The second principle that Derrida affirms is that incalculability and history is intrinsic to an axiom rather than separable from it. Transcendental has to be mediated through history and the empirical, and hence contingency, incalculability is inseparable from the transcendental axiom as the transcendental axiom has to be realized through the relative and the contingent, or the empirical. Incalculability and undecidability are thus intrinsic to transcendental axioms rather than separable from them as Husserl performs through his reduction. Hence closer to the end of his career, Derrida has not fundamentally changed his critique of Husserl as he reiterates the two principles upon which he has found Husserlian phenomenology caught in an aporia- the necessity of temporalization of the presence which makes pure presence and transcendental idealism impossible, and the necessity of incalculability and undecidability to the realization of transcendental axioms. Derrida's argument about Husserl has not changed essentially- it concerns the necessity of acknowledging difference and iterability as the condition of possibility for phenomenology- presence has to be mediated by non-presence, and axioms have to be mediated through contingency and undecidability through history and the empirical. Derrida's contribution to phenomenology thus has been the acknowledgement of the quasi-transcendental and difference which are essential to determining presence as meta-conditions. Derrida does not critique presence but examines the conditions of possibility in which presence and logocentrism are made possible – which he names as difference, iterability and the quasi-transcendental;

¹⁹ Derrida, Jacques. *Rogues: two essays on reason*. Translated by Pascale Ann Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford, California. Stanford University Press, 2005. 130.

which he has developed throughout his career as we see an affirmation of the same principles in which he uses to critique Husserl at the beginning and end of his career. Derrida's concern has been to discover temporalization as necessary to the establishing of presence as well as to affirm that iterability and hence incalculability is necessary to determining transcendental axioms and presence. Over a vast career hence, Derrida has been concerned to save phenomenology from its aporias and contradictions rather than to destroy or invert phenomenology as critics have alleged by discovering the meta-conditions of phenomenology- difference, the quasi-transcendental, and iterability.

In this section I have examined Levinas' turn to an ethical phenomenology in his call to take the Other into account in his phenomenology as the Other exerts an ethical demand for responsibility for one. I then examined how Derrida does not think Levinas manages to escape metaphysics but repeats it as a Jewish variation of the Greek metaphysics as radical empiricism or non-philosophy. Derrida's contribution to phenomenology, as discussed in earlier chapters, is the discovery of the quasi-transcendental or difference which enables phenomenology rather than privileging either Jew or Greek philosophy because philosophy is neither but situated between these intervals as difference.

In this paper I have examined Ricoeur and Levinas' turn to an ethical phenomenology in their emphasis on intersubjectivity and integrating the Other into phenomenology. Derrida would argue however that this overcoming of ipseity and being and essence as a form of non-philosophy repeats metaphysics as a Jewish variant and inscribes metaphysics negatively and thus does not manage to escape metaphysics. Derrida's quasi-transcendental, the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy, or the difference between Jew and Greek, is then shown to be the grounding conditionality of philosophy and phenomenology as difference. Derrida thus performs a meta-phenomenology rather than a reversed phenomenology or a negative phenomenology as Ricoeur and Levinas had done. As I have argued in this paper, the difference between the transcendental and empirical is paradoxically a non-difference, or a sameness. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as these are separated by difference, an interval which is a nothingness and hence, transcendental and empirical are the same. This demonstration of the similarity between transcendental and empirical democratizes phenomenology as radical empiricisms such as Ricoeur

and Levinas' are shown to repeat metaphysics rather than escaping from it, or overcoming it, as an empirical idealism is not distinct from a transcendental idealism, but a repetition of it. Transcendental-empirical distinction is an illusion. The transcendental and empirical are simultaneously identical and non-identical as the distinction translates into a sameness, paradoxically, difference translates into non-difference and thus transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion. Derrida has thus democratized phenomenology in showing radical empirical empiricisms such as Levinas' and Ricoeur's are the same and repetitions of metaphysics rather than deviations or subversions of it. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, truth is then shown to be neither transcendental nor empirical; but quasi-transcendental, the interval between the transcendental and empirical which conditions the thinking of both. It is the aporia between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both as transcendental is nothing outside the empirical through iterability and difference.

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The Mission Of The Apostle Paul: The Beginning Of Christianity In Macedonia

Dragan Zajkovski

Abstract: The beginnings of christianity in Macedonia was in the middle of I century. It's dedicated with the Apostle Paul's missionary. New Testament scripts announced that Paul was the first christian missionary who, in the 50's of the first century, came to Macedonia, preaching. For three times he was in Macedonia converting in christianity large number of macedonian population. Lidia was the first woman in Macedonia that accepted christian belief. In the next period of time Paul's mission had a big success into the every Macedonian cities where he was. Thanksfull his mission, christian municipalities were madden in several macedonian cities: Philipi, Thessaloniki and Beroia. Those are, however, the first christian municipalities in Europe, which, in short period of time, grew into the powerfull communities respectfull not only in Macedonia, but much more far.

Macedonia by its geographical position, in the ancient period had a very important strategic position in the Balkans. Through its territory passed important communication links which linked the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor with the countries of the Adriatic, South and Central Europe. In this context, above all one, we should mention the Via Egnatia, which was one of the most important roads of the Roman state, which in a large part passed through the Macedonian territory. Macedonia, geographically, culturally and in every other respect, played an important role as a bridge between Apennine Peninsula and Asia Minor. Therefore, in general, should not surprise that the first beginnings of Christianity on European soil is exactly in Macedonia.

The spread of Christianity in the territory of Macedonia began early, in mid of First Century and it is closely linked to the missionary activity of the Apostle Paul. Namely, to preach and spread Christianity, not only among Hebrews, but also

among pagans, Paul took three missionary journeys visiting several cities in Asia Minor, Macedonia and Greece.²⁰

First visit to Macedonia, the Apostle Paul realized during his second missionary journey.²¹ Traveling into the interior of Asia Minor, on the road visiting Christian communities established during his first trip,²² Apostle arrived in the city of Alexandria Troas²³ where he met the future evangelist Luke. According to the New Testament text titled as “Acts of the Holy Apostles”²⁴ whose author is considered Evangelist and Apostle Luke, in Alexandria Troas, Paul received a revelation that should go and preach in Macedonia.²⁵ If we exempt mythic elements characteristic of the biblical texts, I believe that this whole episode points to the supposition that the Apostle Paul in Alexandria Troas from the Hebrew merchants there had occasion to meet more specifically the fact that in several Macedonian towns have more Hebrew Communities - financially powerful and politically influential - among whose members there and maybe a number of Christian converts.²⁶ Therefore, the Apostle, from Asia Minor decided to head on European

²⁰ *Acts*: 20 – 21; According Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263 – c. 339) not only the Apostle Paul but also the Apostle Andrew preached Christianity in the Balkan peninsula, without specifying which places from the Balkans are those. (EUSEBIUS, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, III, I, 1) But this information is found only in Eusebius and is not verified in any other source. So I think that should be qualified as unfathered and inaccurate.

²¹ Second missionary journey of the Apostle Paul, F. K. Lukman (LUKMAN, Franc Kvaser, *Kristusovi pricevalci - Martyres Christi*, Celje, 1983) dates in 51 - 52, P. Malicki (МАЛИЦКИ, Петър И., *История на християнската църква – първи период от основаването на църквата до тържеството ѝ при Константин Велики [34 – 31]*, том първи, София, 1994.) in 51-54/55 years., Celestin Tomic (ТОМИЌ, Celestin, *Savao Pavao, vrijeme, život i djelo apostola Pavla*, Zagreb 1982) at 49 to 53, and W. Harrington (HARRINGTON, Wilfrid J., *Uvod u Novi zavjet*, Zagreb, 1983), U. Schnelle (SCHNELLE, Udo, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology*) and J.D.G. Dunn (DUNN, James D.G., *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*) in 49-52.

²² According P. Malicki (МАЛИЦКИ, Петър И., *Op.cit.*, 43) First missionary journey of the Apostle Paul dates in 45/46 – latest in 51, according W. Harrington (HARRINGTON, Wilfrid J., *Op. cit.*, 76) in 45 – 49, according Celestin Tomic (ТОМИЌ, Celestin, *Op. cit.*, 54) in 46 - 49, and U. Schnelle (SCHNELLE, Udo, *Op. cit.*, 81) and J.D.G. Dunn (DUNN, James D.G., *Op. cit.*, 65) it dates in 49-52.

²³ Alexandria of Troas was situated about 25 km. south of Troy.

²⁴ *Acts*: 16, 9 – 10.

²⁵ “*Et visio per noctem Paulo ostensa est: vir Macedo quidam erat stans et deprecans eum et dicens: “Transiens in Macedoniam, adiuva nos! ”. Ut autem visum vidit, statim quaesivimus proficisci in Macedoniam, certi facti quia vocasset nos Deus evangelizare eis.*” (*Acts*: 16, 9 – 10)

²⁶ Since the first Apostolic Council, approximately 49, the Christian teaching was preached and spread mostly among Hebrews. Hence, in the period before the arrival of the Apostle Paul in

soil, in Macedonia, assuming that there will be a success in the preaching of Christianity among Hebrew communities in the Macedonian cities.

As reported autor of “Acts of the Holy Apostles”, immediately after this Providence, the Apostle Paul with his associates Silas, Timothy and Luke, from the Troas moved to Macedonia.²⁷ Reaching first on port Neapolis²⁸ they left to the Macedonian city of Philippi. Starting from this fact, history science, rightfully claim that Macedonia is the first European country visited by the Apostle Paul and also the first European country where the Christianity spread.

What has caused controversy is the question about the accurate dating of the first missionary trip of the Apostle Paul in Macedonia. So that, the earliest dating is in years 49 to 50, or the end of the 49.²⁹ Approximate dating also gives the Greek historian Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos³⁰ who believes that Paul first visited Macedonia in the year 50. In contrast, George Pop - Atanasov³¹ says: “*missionary journey of Paul in Macedonia started in 51. and completed in 54, which during those years the apostle visited Macedonian and some Greek cities, where also were established Christian church communities.*”

Despite the polemics about the dating, New Testament texts³² unambiguously point to the conclusion that during his stay in Philippi,³³ Paul had significant success in the preaching of Christianity. Since the early days of his arrival in the city, the Apostle, with his sermons, has managed to reverse in the faith of

Macedonia, just among the Hebrew population in the Macedonian cities should be sought first Christians.

²⁷ Acts: 16, 11.

²⁸ In the ancient city of Neapolis, or modern Kavala, in the place where, according to Biblical tradition, the Apostle Paul first set foot on European soil there is a church dedicated to Saint Nicholas. On the marble floor in the church there is a circle which marks the exact spot where, according to the Acts of the Apostles, the apostle Paul step down from the ship arriving in Macedonian and European soil.

²⁹ STENDAHL, Krister, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays*, Augsburg, 1977, 57 – 58; *History of the Macedonian people*, vol. I, 2000, 213.

³⁰ VACALOPOULOS, Apostolos E., *A History of Thessaloniki*, Institute for Balkans Studies, Thessalonike 1963, 17.

³¹ ПООП – АТАНАСОВ, Ѓорѓин, *Библијата за Македонија и Македонците*, Скопје 1995, 105.

³² Acts: 16: 12 – 40; *Philippians*: 1 – 4.

³³ Ancient city of Philippi was located about 15 to 17 km. distance from Neapolis. The city was founded by the Macedonian king Philip II in 356 B.C. and soon after it became the center of the cultural, religious and commercial activity in the region.

Christ many residents of Philippi.³⁴ In this context it is important to note that the first sermons were held outside of the city nearby river where the locals have a tradition to come out of prayer.³⁵ If we know the fact that one of the most important cults in the religion of the ancient Macedonians was the cult of the river where sacrifice usually was made³⁶ can likely be assumed that the first hearers of sermons of the Apostle Paul was above ancient Macedonians which their religious practices were customary to leave the city to pray and offered sacrifices to the River.

According to biblical tradition, the first, who had accepted Christianity in the territory of Macedonia, was a woman named Lydia in Philippi a dealer in purple cloths from the city of Thyatira – Asia Minor’s Macedonian colony.³⁷ She along with her entire family was baptised and offered them accommodation of the Apostle and his associates.³⁸ Among other Macedonians, citizens of Philippi, who have accepted Christ's teaching, primarily as a result of the sermons of Paul, was a slave girl who had a spirit of divination and brought her owners much gain by fortune-telling.

Great success in the preaching of Christianity among the inhabitants of Philippi could not remain unnoticed by the local Roman magistrates. Officials encouraged by fanatic pagan believers and also fearing for their own interests ordered to be arrested Paul and his assistant Silas. But the very next day they were released thanks to the fact that Paul was a Roman citizen and hence enjoyed certain privileges in any arrests and investigations.

In the context of their short stay in the local jail an interesting fact contained in the Acts of the Holy Apostles which says that during the same time, Paul and Silas, managed to baptise not only prisoners but also guard who was in

³⁴ Celestine Tomic think that in the city of Philippi was small Hebrew community. (TOMIC, Celestine, *Op. cit.*, 244). But this assumption can not be confirmed either by written or on the basis of archaeological sources. Furthermore it is unlikely to be assumed that if in the city really existed a small number of Hebrew community that the author of Acts of the Holy Apostles will forget to say about it.

³⁵ *Acts*: 16, 13.

³⁶ Herodotus reported ancient Macedonians worshiped rivers as Gods and they often made sacrifices to the River The Savior. (HERODOTUS, VIII, 138)

³⁷ Ancient city of Thyatira (present Akhisar) was a Macedonian colony founded in 290 B.C. by Seleucus I Nicator (312 – 281) (STRABO, XIII, 4)

³⁸ *Acts*: 16, 11 – 15.

charge to keep them. He even called them to come to his house where all family members were baptised and accepted Christ's teachings.³⁹

From all this, contained in the Acts of the Holy Apostles, conclusion is that the Christian faith, for a relatively short period, was adopted by a significant number of ancient Macedonians, citizens of Philippi. The city had a Christian municipality - the first in Europe - founded by the Apostle Paul himself. The Epistle to the Philippians announced that it had established usual ecclesiastical hierarchy headed by the bishop.⁴⁰ Evidence for the existence of a bishop in Philippi is an argument in favor of the thesis that the Philippi's church municipality had a significant number of members. One of the characteristics of the Christian Church in the 2nd and the 3rd century is that only in cities with large Christian community had bishops, which actually was the case with the community in Philippi.

New Testament texts with certainty confirm that Epaphroditus was the first bishop of the Philippi's christian church municipality. His name, in the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, explicitly referred to as bishop of Philippi, in the context of his visit to the Apostle who was send into exile in Rome, where he waited for a trial.⁴¹ In the Epistle to the Philippians, Paul, among others, thanks for their zeal in the faith and the support and assistance given to him.⁴² After analyzing this part of the Epistle to the Philippians can be assumed that when they understood the Apostle Paul's exil in Rome, Philippians immediately sent his bishop Epaphroditus visit to Rome sending an appropriate material assistance to the Apostle.⁴³

After staying and preaching in Philippi, the Apostle Paul, Silas and Timothy left for Thessalonika, where was a great Hebrew community and where he again successfully preached the Christian doctrine. On the way to Thessaloniki, they visited the cities of Amphipolis and Apollonia.⁴⁴ Although no specific data source, however, can be assumed that when visiting these cities, Paul held sermons in which probably baptised unknown number of believers.

³⁹ *Acts*: 16, 16 – 40.

⁴⁰ *Philippians*: 1, 1.

⁴¹ *Philippians*: 2, 25 – 30; 4, 18. It can be assumed that the Apostle Paul used the visit of Epaphroditus to sent his letter to the church community in Philippi.

⁴² *Philippians*: 4, 14 – 23.

⁴³ *Philippians*: 4, 16.

⁴⁴ Ancient city Apollonia which visited Paul with his associates was in Macedonia on the road Via Egnatia between Amphipolis and Thessaloniki. In antiquity several cities had carried the name Apollonia of which most famous was a Greek colony of Apollonia in Illyria (modern Fier, Albania).

Arriving in Thessaloniki, the Apostle, first, he started his sermons between local Hebrews, which were many, and thus constitute a strong community in the city.⁴⁵ However, Paul does not limit the sermon only in the local Hebrew community, but rather, according to its well established practice, he converted to Christianity many other, non Hebrews, ancient Macedonian population, residents of Thessaloniki and the surrounding area.⁴⁶ Apostle Paul familiar with the situation in the Hebrew community in Thessaloniki realized that Hebrews will not easily accept the Christian teaching, and he concentrated his missionary activity to the autochthonous Macedonian population. For a short time in the Christian ranks have entered many of the Macedonians, laying the foundations of a way of Thessaloniki Christian community. In organizational terms, Church of Thessaloniki from the beginning, was very well-established, so that became the template for all the Christian communities in Macedonia and Achaia.⁴⁷

Faced with huge popularity of 'new' learning and successful missionary work of Paul among the local population, some orthodox Hebrews started strong action directed against members of the newly formed Christian community in Thessalonica. They in front of the local Roman government began to amount to a series of lies and slanders not only against Paul and Silas, but against all those who accepted Christianity. Precisely because of this great pressure from the Hebrew community in Thessalonica, Paul, Silas and Timothy were forced to leave town and go to Beroia.⁴⁸ These events around the departure of Paul and his associates from Thessaloniki to Beroia can be dated in early 51.

As reported historical sources in Beroia and Thessaloniki, there were strong Hebrew community. Similarly as in Thessalonica, Paul's and Silas first sermons were held in the local synagogue in Beroia. But now, with the difference that were nobler received by local Hebrews. Besides members of the Hebrew community,

⁴⁵ Since the first years after its founding in 316 B.C. in Thessaloniki settled first traders from Hebrew origin. (VACALOPOULOS, Apostolos E., *Op. cit.*, 9) This small early Hebrew community over time, developed and grew reaching the peak of its economic power in the Roman period, when Thessaloniki became the main crossroad between Asia Minor and Rome.

⁴⁶ *Acts*: 17,4; *1 Thessalonians*: 1, 9.

⁴⁷ *1 Thessalonians*: 1, 7 – 8. In this context are words of Tertallianus who wrote: „... *Proxima est tibi Achaia, habes Corinthum. Si non longe es a Macedonia, habes Philippos, Thessalonike; si potes in Asiam tendere, habes Ephesum; si autem Italiae adiaces, habes Romam unde nobis quoque auctoritas praesto est.*“ (TERTULLIANUS, *De Praescriptione Haereticorum*, XXXVI, 2)

⁴⁸ *Acts*: 17, 5 – 10.

Christianity, was received overwhelmingly by local Macedonians from Beroia and surrounding areas.⁴⁹ For success in preaching of Christianity in Beroia soon understood the authorities in Thessaloniki. Particularly upset by this continued success of the Apostle Paul, and now we can say non - stopping spread of Christianity in this part of Macedonia, Hebrew priests with their power and reputation constantly pushing the local government to take concrete action directed against Paul and his closest associates. Faced with such strong pressure, and probably fearing for their personal safety after set of healthy fundamentals newly Christian communities, the Apostle Paul left Macedonia, referring to Greece. Soon after his associates Timothy and Silas left in Greece, too.⁵⁰

According to data contained in the Acts of the Holy Apostles, Apostle Paul, during his third missionary journey⁵¹ twice, again, visited Macedonia. These two recent visits to Macedonia are dated between 56 and 58 A.D.⁵² and during which the Apostle, together with its associates and Timothy and Erastus⁵³ visited Christian communities in Philippi, Thessaloniki and Beroia, where it can be assumed, existed a strong Christian community. Indeed, and the motive for his second stay in Macedonia should be sought in his desire to visit earlier established Christian communities in Macedonia, in order personally to ensure how they operate and to give them instructions and advice to continue to cope with everyday problems.⁵⁴ With this purpose should be understood his two letters addressed to the Christian

⁴⁹ *Acts*: 17, 11 – 12.

⁵⁰ *Acts*: 17, 13 – 15.

⁵¹ The Third missionary journey of the Apostle Paul, F. K. Lukman (LUKMAN, Franc Kvaser, *Kristusovi pricevalci - Martyres Christi*, Celje, 1983) dates in 53 – 58, P. Malicki (МАЛИЦКИ, Петър И., *История на християнската църква – първи период от основаването на църквата до тържеството ѝ при Константин Велики (34 – 313)*, том първи, София, 1994.) in 55/56 – 58/59, acordind Celestin Tomic (ТОМИЌ, Celestin, *Savao Pavao, vrijeme, život i djelo apostola Pavla*, Zagreb 1982) at 53 - 59, and W. Harrington (HARRINGTON, Wilfrid J., *Uvod u Novi zavjet*, Zagreb, 1983), U. Schnelle (SHENELLE, Udo, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology*) and J.D.G. Dunn (DUNN, James D.G., *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*) in 53 - 57.

⁵² Acordind *The History of Macedonian people*, vol. I, p.214 the second journey of the Apostle Paul in Macedonia is dated in 56. On the oposite Celestin Tomic and Georgi Pop Atanasov thinks that it must be dated in 57, and the third one in 58 (ТОМИЌ, Celestin, *Op.cit.*, 94; ПОП – АТАНАСОВ, Георги, *Op.cit.*, 123)

⁵³ *Acts*: 19, 22.

⁵⁴ During his third jorney to Macedonia, the Apostle Paul was accompanied by: “Sopater Pyrrhi Beroeensis, Thessalonicensium vero Aristarchus et Secundus et Gaius Derbeus et Timotheus, Asiani vero Tychicus et Trophimus”. (*Acts*: 20, 4)

municipality of Thessaloniki and the Epistle addressed to Christians in Philippi. Given that the Apostle Paul felt the need to write letters to the Christians in Thessaloniki and Philippi may likely to assume that Christian communities in the Macedonian cities in the relatively short time had grown into large and powerful Christian community, with well-known reputation, not only in Macedonia, but also beyond.⁵⁵

Existence of strong Christian church communities in Thessalonica, Philippi and Beroia, primarily due to the mission of the Apostle Paul, constitute the basis for the rapid spread of Christianity in other parts of ancient Macedonia. New Testament texts,⁵⁶ patristic literature,⁵⁷ archeological findings and artifacts, as well as the lives of Christian martyrs, referring to the assumption that, starting from the second half of the First century, in several Macedonian towns began to exist in Christian communities.

⁵⁵ As New Testament texts reports church communities in Macedonia had been able to send certain contribution for the the municipality of Jerusalem. (*Romans*: 15, 26; *1 Corinthians*: 16, 1 – 2; *2 Corinthians*: 8, 1 - 2)

⁵⁶ *Actus Apostolorum*; *Epistula ad Philippenses*; *Epistula I & II ad Thessalonicenses*; *Epistula ad Romanos*; *Epistula I & II ad Corinthios*.

⁵⁷ POLYCARP, *Epistola ad Phillipenses*, III, C; XI, A (Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graecae, ed. Migne, tomus V, Paris 1894)

Multikulturalizam: u potrazi za pojmom

Džemal Sokolović

Abstract: Interes za multikulturalizmom se hipertrofirano javlja u dobu nacionalizma. Članak polazi od hipoteze da su kultura i društvo dva međusobno uslovljena fenomena. Pretpostavka multikulturalizma je otvorenost kulture uopće, pa prema tome i svake posebne kulture. Sve su kulture otvorene, ali u vrlo različitom stepenu, pa je stoga moguće govoriti i o zatvorenosti kultura. Autor predlaže da se otvorenost-zatvorenost kulture posmatra u sljedećim oblicima: difuzija kulturnih elemenata, kontakt kultura i multikulturalizam, s jedne strane, i homogenost, ksenofobičnost i represivnost kultura, s druge strane. Članak nudi i sljedeću tipologiju multikulturalizama: marginalni, intra-multikulturalizam, stratifikacijski, minoritetski i amalgamski multikulturalizam. Iako teorijski orijentiran, članak je posebno fokusiran na iskustvo Balkana i Bosne.

Key words: *multiculturalism, openness/closure of cultures, typology of multiculturalism*

Uvod

Nema nikakve sumnje da su se interes i potreba za multikulturalizmom, ma šta pod tom maglovitom sintagmom podrazumjevali, hipertrofirano pojavili u našem vremenu, vremenu nacionalizma.(1) Ono što nije sasvim izvjesno jeste pitanje da li su se ti interes i potreba javili zato što multikulturalizam danas postaje dominantan ili zato što odstupa pred euforijom nacionalizma. Ako između nacionalizma, kao oblika društvenog grupiranja modernog vremena, i multikulturalizma postoji ikakva veza, onda multikulturalizam definitivno nije samo kulturni nego i socijalni fenomen. Društvo kao takvo - kao i svaka pojedinačna socijalna pojava - ima se posmatrati i kao rezultat kulturnog razvitka čovjeka. I kultura kao takva, jednako kao i svaki pojedinačni kulturni fenomen, ima se takodjer posmatrati kao plod socijalnog razvoja čovjeka. Fenomeni društvo i kultura nisu entiteti, odvojeni i neovisni. Upravo zato, polazna metodološka tačka ovog istraživanja će biti da su

društvo i kultura međusobno povezani, uslovljeni i određeni. Ono što može biti predmet rasprave jeste priroda njihovog odnosa, tj. u kojoj mjeri kultura određuje društvo i *vice versa*, a posebno šta stoji u osnovi i jednog i drugog, determinirajući i njihov međusobni odnos.

Prije nekoliko godina, na jednoj konferenciji u Bergenu, nakon predavanja o nacionalizmu, za koji sam tvrdio da postaje dominantnom odlikom našeg doba, jedna slušateljka mi se suprotstavila tvrdeći da je, upravo obrnuto, multikulturalizam ono što karakterizira naše vrijeme. Na pitanje gdje ona vidi multikulturalizam rekla je: “U Bergenu! Ovdje žive ljudi iz 180 etničkih grupa.” Argument je bio impresivan. U Bosni, o kojoj se obično govorilo kao paradigmi multikulturalnog društva, u vremenu nacionalizma, a nakon dugog perioda uzajamne tolerancije, respekta, pa i uzivanja u drugima i drugačijima, nije bilo moguće uspostaviti ravnotežu i toleranciju između samo tri etničke grupe. Kako je to onda uspjelo u jednom gradu, ili jednom društvu, koje je zbir ljudi iz 180 narodnih grupa? Znači li to da su stoljeća zajedničkog života tri različita naroda, tri kulture i tri religije u Bosni, bila samo privid multikulturalizma koji je nestao čim su se otvorili procesi nacionalističkog grupiranja, a da je bergenski model koegzistencije 180 različitih naroda, kultura i vjera, započet prije samo nekoliko decenija, dokaz odsustva nacionalizma? Ovim pitanjem u stvari želim da potražim rješenje za osnovnu teorijsku dilemu konceptualiziranja ovog pojma: da li je multikulturalizam zbir *dvije*, *tri* ili *n* kultura, ili je multikulturalizam nešto više od puke *sume*, pa ma kolika ona bila? Ako bi multikulturalizam bio samo zbir više kultura onda bi moja bergenska oponentica bila u pravu. Moje istraživanje pojma multikulturalizma, međutim, polazi od sasvim drugačije hipoteze. Multikulturalizam podrazumjeva kulturni pluralizam ali je nešto više od pukog zbira više kultura.

1. Ambivalentni karakter multikulturalizma

Najjednostavnija percepcija multikulturalizma jeste ona koja pojmu multikulturalizma pristupa kao kulturi u pluralu. Da bismo razumjeli šta je kultura u pluralu, tj. multikulturalizam već na nivou percepcije, moramo obezbijediti i pretpostavke. U ovom slučaju premise pojma *multikulturalizam*, koje treba tek odrediti, jesu: 1. pojam *kulture*, i 2. pojam *jedne* kulture, jer je *kultura u singularu* uslov

da se shvati i *kultura u pluralu*, bez obzira da li se taj plural sastojao od zbira tri ili 180 različitih pojedinačnih kultura. Međutim, upravo ove premise najčešće nedostaju.

Lakoća kojom se danas upotrebljava pojam multikulturalizma proizlazi iz toga što se pojmovi koji ga sačinjavaju naprosto podrazumjevaju. Šta je to jedna kultura, koja je to kritična masa kulturnih elemenata neophodna da bi se moglo govoriti o jednoj kulturi distinktivnoj od drugih, koji je(su) to kriterij(i) – etnički, nacionalni, regionalni, politički, religijski, socijalni itd. – koji definira(ju) jednu kulturu, gdje su granice koje je odvajaju od drugih pojedinačnih kultura i na kojima stupa u odnos s drugacijim kulturama i, najzad, kada taj odnos s drugim kulturama poprima karakter fenomena zvanog multikulturalizam? S druge strane, postoje desetine, neki tvrde čak stotine definicija kulture, pa ipak pitanje šta je kultura ostaje i dalje otvoreno. Oba ova pitanja ce ostati neodgovorena za neko vrijeme i na ovom mjestu. Čitaocima naprosto prepuštam da imaju na umu pojmove i kulture i jedne kulture, za koje se podrazumjeva da ih već imaju, ma kakvi oni bili.

U dosadašnjim akademskim i neakademskim (političkim, ideološkim, žurnalističkim itd.) diskusijama o multikulturalizmu mogu se prepoznati dvije tendencije: jedna koja podrazumjeva da je multikulturalizam nešto samo po sebi pozitivno i kao takvo neupitno, i drugu koja ga *a priori* odbacuje podrazumjevajući da je nešto negativno i štetno. U oba slucaja multikulturalizam se uzima kao nešto samo po sebi razumljivo. Potrebe za njegovim pojmovnim definiranjem uopće nema. Ovako ambivalentna percepcija multikulturalizma, od njegovog glorificiranja do satanizacije, u stvari je posljedica ambivalentnog karaktera multikulturalizma kao takvog. Multikulturalizam naime nije niti nešto negativno ali ni pozitivno *per se*. Da li će jedno multikulturalno stanje biti pozitivno ili negativno sa stanovišta društva zavisi od tog društva, a ne od multikulturalizma samog. Otuda dolazi i ambivalentan stav prema Balkanu: s jedne strane, kao paradigmi multikulturalizma ali i, s druge, kao paradigmi nacionalizma nastalom, izazvanom i hranjenom na tlu multikulturalizma.

Evropa, Zapad, Svijet su opsjednuti misionarskom zadaćom da nauče Balkan pravom, održivom multikulturalizmu. I površni poznavalac Balkana, čak i prije čitanja "Imagining the Balkans", zna da je Balkan svojim iskustvom i dostignućima u koegzistenciji različitih kultura, vjera, naroda, pa i čitavih civilizacija, obogatio multikulturalnu istoriju čovječanstva. Da li neuspjesi međunarodne zajednice u "restauraciji" multikulturalizma balkanskih društava proizlaze iz

skorojevićkog stanja u kome je učenik (Svijet) postao učitelj, očito nedovoljno uspješan, ili se radi o tome da su ušenci (Balkan) zaista beznadežno loši? Radi li se, dakle, o tome da Balkan još treba učiti od Svijeta lekciju koja se zove multikulturalizam, ili je Svijet, ipak, imao još da nauči od Balkana?

Slučaj Bosne, barem u skorije vrijeme, je posebno indikativan. Na ovom primjeru se najpregnantnije potvrdilo gdje može dovesti misionarska namjera Zapada da mehanički presadi multikulturalno iskustvo iz jedne nacionalno unitarne sredine, u jednu multietničku, religijski pluralističku, kulturno kompozitnu sredinu kakav je Balkan. (2) Suočena s vlastitim permanentnim neuspjesima da “restaurira” multietničko društvo u Bosni, međunarodna zajednica je sama morala priznati da jedina sfera koja je počela funkcionirati multietnički jeste ona koja je izvan njene kontrole – mafija. “Arizona road”, mjesto saradnje Bosnjaka, Hrvata i Srba, funkcionira u neposrednoj blizini američkog garnizona i bez američkog blagoslova, na istom principu kao i, recimo, Wall Street – interesu u gotovom.

Zapadne percepcije multikulturalizma su se sudarale sa bosanskim (balkanskim) realitetom multikulturalizma čak i u toku najžešćih borbi triju zaraćenih strana. Uvjeren da se tamo vodi vjerski, etnički ili čak rat civilizacija, stranac je ostajao zbunjen pred kontroverznom stvarnošću. Kada su u Mostaru 1993. zaratili katolički Hrvati i muslimanski Bošnjaci, a topovi pravoslavnih Srba za trenutak utihnuli, jedan bošnjački oficir, u stanju očajne nestašice artiljerijske podrške, poziva svog bivšeg prijatelja srpskog artiljerca da mu pomogne. Ovaj pristaje, uz upozorenje da će ga pola sata artiljerijske podrške po hrvatskim položajima stajati 50 njemačkih maraka. Nakon što je 30 minuta prošlo, a artiljerijski plotuni preko muslimanskih glava nisu prestajali, Bošnjak je nazvao svog srpskog kolegu i rekao da on ne može više platiti, ovaj mu je odgovorio: “Ovo je na moj račun. Kuća časti...”

Oni koji sukob u Bosni, da bi zadovoljili zahtjeve svojih predstava i predrasuda, nazivaju sukobom civilizacijski veoma distinktivnih, očito ne znaju mnogo o civilizacijskom multikulturalizmu. Kako neko ko dolazi iz kulture, nacije ili civilizacije, u kojoj je naučen da se plasi drugačijih prije nego ih je i vidio, mrzi ih čak i kada ih ne poznaje, i ubija najradije sa distance, da shvati da se na Balkanu, tom multikulturnom kazanu, ljudi ne mrze ni kada se ubijaju, ne boje ih se ni kada ih mrze, a tolerišu, respektiraju, pa čak i uživaju u njihovoj distinktivnosti, i kada ih se boje.

2. Otvorenost-zatvorenost kultura

Pretpostavka bilo kakvog diskursa o multikulturalizmu jeste premisa da je kultura kao takva, a to znači i svaka pojedinačna kultura, bez obzira na kriterij njene posebnosti, koji je odvaja od drugih kultura, otvorena za druge pojedinačne kulture. Na čemu zasnivamo ovu apriornu tvrdnju objasniti ćemo na drugom mjestu. Pa ipak, pitanje da li su i koliko kulture otvorene ili zatvorene ima smisla. Odgovor na ovo pitanje zavisi da li ga dajemo sa optimističkog ili pesimističkog stanovišta.

Ne postoje apsolutno zatvorene kulture. Kulturna autarhija je istorijska devijacija; kulturne robinzonijade su sporadična pojava. Zato s pravom možemo reći da je otvorenost svojstvo kulture kao takve. Kulturni autarhizam ne proizlazi iz kulture nego iz okolnosti u kojima se kultura nalazi. Ipak, mora se priznati, kulture su otvorene u veoma različitom stepenu. Zato se i o zatvorenosti kultura može i mora govoriti, ali u sasvim relativnom smislu. Zavisno od toga kakvim očima posmatramo, kulture su ili zatvorene ili otvorene. Ovo podsjeća neodoljivo na priču o čaši do pola napunjenoj vodom. Za pesimistu ona je poluprazna, za optimistu čaša je napola puna. Ista kultura je, dakle, u jednoj percepciji zatvorena, a u drugoj otvorena. Mlada generacija je, recimo, uvijek gladna kulturnih elemenata koji dolaze iz drugih kultura; u očima starijih, novotarije koje dolaze iz drugih kultura radije se percipiraju kao opasnost za vlastitu kulturu i zahtjeva zaštita od negativnih uticaja izvana. Razmotrimo ukratko fenomen otvorenosti-zatvorenosti kultura s oba stanovišta.

a) Stepni otvorenosti kultura

Prvo ćemo otvorenost-zatvorenost kultura istražiti s optimističkog stanovišta, dakle sa stanovišta koje kulture percipira kao otvorene. Objektivno, otvorenost kultura se pokazuje u različitom *stepenu*. Neke kulture su otvorene manje, druge više. Stepni otvorenosti kultura određuje, u stvari, i *stadije* otvorenosti, odnosno zatvorenosti kultura. Predlažemo da otvorenost kultura posmatramo u tri osnovna stadija:

1. *Difuzija kulturnih elemenata* iz jedne kulture u druge je početni oblik otvorenosti;
2. *Kontakt kultura* (bilo u *konfliktnom* ili *prožimajućem* obliku) je sljedeći, obuhvatni i viši stepen otvorenosti-zatvorenosti kultura jednih prema drugima; i najzad,
3. *Multikulturalizam* je najviši stepen otvorenosti jedne kulture drugima.

Razmotrimo svaki od ova tri nivoa ili stadija u razvitku otvorenosti pojedinačnih ili posebnih kultura.

1. *Difuzija kulturnih elemenata* - Govoriti o difuziji elemenata kulture, dakle "putovanju" pojedinih elemenata iz jedne u drugu kulturu, podrazumjeva da je već izvršena izvjesna diverzifikacija na pojedinačne kulture. Osnova te diverzifikacije može biti različita: socijalna (plemenska, etnička kultura, itd), religijska (politeistička, monoteistička kultura, itd.), politička (atenska, spartanska kultura, itd), ideološka (buržoaska, proleterska kultura, itd.), regionalna (balkanska, evropska, zapadna kultura, itd.), itd. U svakoj od ovih pojedinačnih kultura koriste se elementi koji su difuzijom stigli iz neke druge, susjedne ili veoma udaljene kulture. Ljudi često nisu svjesni porijekla kulturnih elemenata koje upotrebljavaju ili prakticiraju u vlastitoj kulturi. Često se ti elementi svjesno prisvajaju i smatraju autohtono vlastitim. Ono što se posebno zanemaruje i čak svjesno ne priznaje jeste broj kulturnih elemenata koji nisu autohtono naši, nego potiču iz drugih kultura. Štaviše, posebno se u nekim slučajevima nastoji prikriti kultura porijekla tih elemenata. U periodima različitih nacionalizama, šovinizama ili rasizama svjesno se potiskuje recimo semitsko ili islamsko ili afričko porijeklo nekog elementa kulture duboko prihvaćenog i ukorijenjenog u vlastitoj. U periodu islamofobije, koja karakterizira savremeno stanje evropske i američke kulturne svijesti, posebno se potiskuje arapsko porijeklo velikog broja kulturnih elemenata kojima je islamska civilizacija zadužila Evropljane i čovječanstvo.

Smatra se, međutim, da se upravo najrazvijenije savremene kulture sastoje od velikog broja elemenata koji potiču iz drugih kultura. Kulturna antropologija cijeni da tek svaki hiljaditi kulturni elementat potiče iz naše vlastite kulture i nase generacije, dok preostalih 999 promila kulturnih elemenata dolaze difuzijom iz drugih kultura ili potiče od generacija koje su živjele prije nas. Pa ipak, i pored toga, mi naše kulture zovemo ili zapadnom, ili evropskom, ili britanskom, ili engleskom,

ili čak viktorijanskom, itd.

Ono što karakterizira difuziju kulturnih elemenata jeste da se specifični identitet kultura u odnosu ne gubi bez obzira na broj elemenata koji dolaze iz drugih kultura.

2. Kontakt kultura - Viši stadij u razvoju otvorenosti kultura jeste kontakt kultura. Pored difuzije velikog broja elemenata kulture iz jedne u drugu pojedinačnu kulturu, istorija je zabilježila i slučajeve u kojima su čitave kulture dolazile u međusobni dodir. Takvi slučajevi su bili posljedica ili velikih migracija čitavih kulturnih ili etničkih grupa, ili pak posljedica ratova ili velikih ekonomskih migracija. Dok kod difuzije imamo migraciju elemenata kulture, dotle kod kontakta kultura se radi o migraciji čitavih socijalnih grupa koje su nosile sa sobom svoje kulture u cjelini.

Kontakti kultura u kojima su se susretale velike socijalne grupe mogli su se dogoditi na dva načina: 1. Kontakt kultura može biti konfliktualan, kao što se dogodilo u mnogo slučajeva tokom istorije. Konflikti nisu donosili samo razaranje i uništavanje drugih kultura nego su vrlo često rezultirali visokim stepenom akulturacije. 2. Kontakti kultura, pogotovo u slučaju velikih seoba naroda, ali i savremenih političkih ili ekonomskih migracija, mogu imati i prožimajući karakter.

Kao i kod difuzije kulturnih elemenata, tako se ni u slučaju kontakta kultura ne gubi specifični identitet kultura u odnosu. Bez obzira na veliki stepen akulturacije pojedinačne kulture u kontaktu zadržavaju svoje specifične identitete. Po tome su difuzija kulturnih elemenata i kontakt kultura, bez obzira na kvantitativnu razliku u stepenu miješanja dvije ili više kultura, kvalitativno isti oblici otvorenosti.

3. **Multikulturalizam** je najviši stepen otvorenosti kultura. Kao takav, multikulturalizam prevazilazi difuziju kulturnih elemenata i kontakt kultura ne samo u kvantitativnom nego i u kvalitativnom smislu. Sa multikulturalizmom dolazi nešto novo. Ono što multikulturalizam odvaja od prethodna dva stepena otvorenosti kulture i čini njegovu *esenciju* jeste sljedeće. Kao što smo rekli, kod difuzije kulturnih elemenata ili kontakta kultura se ne gubi specifični identitet kultura u odnosu. Specifičnost kulturnih identiteta se ne gubi ni u slučaju multikulturalizma, on ostaje, ali nastaje i novi, zajednički identitet dviju ili više kultura; multikulturalizam je, prema tome, proces nastajanja *dvostrukog* ili čak *multipliciranog kulturnog identiteta*.⁽³⁾ Potrebno je, dakle, podcrtati i upozoriti da multikulturalizam nije proces niti

brisanja jednog identiteta i prihvatanje drugog, niti pak nastajanje novog identiteta po cijenu odricanja od prethodnih. *Asimilacija* kao supsumiranje jedne kulture drugom i u krajnjem brisanje jednog identiteta drugim je proces suprotan multikulturalizmu. Multikulturalizam također nije ni *integracija*, tj. takav odnos kultura u kome se zadržava specifični identitet kultura u kontaktu, ali i uspostavlja odnos izrazite dominacije jedne kulture u odnosu na drugu.(4) Multikulturalizam je naprosto proces nastajanja novog, zajedničkog, općeg kulturnog identiteta, uz potpuno zadržavanje posebnih ili pojedinačnih identiteta. Zato se i postavlja koliko teorijsko, ali i sasvim pragmatično pitanje: gdje se zbiva proces multikulturalizma - u Bergenu ili Bosni, u Skandinaviji ili na Balkanu?

b) Stepeni zatvorenosti kultura

Fenomen otvorenosti-zatvorenosti kultura se, kao što smo rekli, može posmatrati i sa pesimističkog stanovista. U tom smislu, pitanje koje nas zanima jeste u kakvom odnosu stoje otvorenost kulture, u svim njenim stepenima, uključujući i multikulturalizam, sa stepenima zatvorenosti kulture. Posmatrana s pesimističkog stanovišta otvorenost se pojavljuje kao zatvorenost i ispoljava u različitim stepenima, odnosno stadijima.

Predložimo da zatvorenost kultura razmotrimo kroz tri sljedeća stepena ili stadija:

1. *Homogenost*, odnosno *kohezivnost* kultura;
2. *Ksenofobičnost*, i najzad,
3. *Represivnost/agresivnost* kultura

Svaki od ovih stepena zatvornosti kultura ima svoj kontrapunkt u odgovarajućim stepenima otvorenosti kultura. Tako su homogene, odnosno kohezivne kulture jedine sposobne za multikulturalizam, ksenofobičnost se pojavljuje u slučaju kontakta kultura, dok je najviši stepen zatvorenosti kultura, koji se ispoljava kao represivnost/agresivnost, sposoban tek za difuziju pojedinih kulturnih elemenata iz drugih kultura.

1. Homogenost/kohezivnost kultura - Zvuči "logično" da su *homogene* (grč. *homoios* - jednak, isti, sličan; grc. *genos* – rod, vrsta) kulture manje otvorene prema drugima i obrnuto. Iz svakodnevnog govora se nekritički preuzima da su vrlo zatvorene kulture homogene. Međutim, čini se da stvarnost često nadilazi logiku. Otvorenost jedne kulture, naime, nije u obrnuto proporcionalnom odnosu prema njenoj homogenosti. Homogene i kohezivne kulture mogu biti veoma otvorene. Homogene ili kohezivne (lat. *cobaerere* – biti svezan, prijanjati) kulture su vrlo receptivne za kulturne elemente koji dolaze iz drugih kultura; one su sklone i kontaktima s drugim kulturama kao takvim; i najzad, kao vrhunac ove alogičnosti čini se da su upravo homogene i kohezivne kulture sposobne za multikulturalizam. Homogene kulture su, naime, samouvjerene, bez straha da će u kontaktu s drugima izgubiti svoj identitet i tek kao takve imaju sposobnost da izgrade zajednički, multikulturni identitet bez opasnosti za svoj vlastiti.

2. Ksenofobične (grc. *xènos* – stranac; grc. *fobeomai* – bojim se) kulture mogu, također, biti otvorene prema drugim kulturama. Otvorenost prema stranom, tuđem i nepoznatom često je rado prihvaćena nužnost, iako i nedobrodošla opasnost za vlastiti identitet. Ovo se, naravno, odnosi na receptivnost pojedinih kulturnih elemenata koji dolaze iz drugih kultura, pa i na globalni kontakt s njima. Ksenofobične kulture, međutim, nikada nisu u stanju izgraditi identitet koji bi dijelile s drugima i uporedo s vlastitim. Njihov strah od drugih sprečava ih da svoju otvorenost, manje ili više potisnutu, pretvore u istinski multikulturalizam. Kod ksenofobičnih kultura uočljiv je ne samo strah od drugih nego prije svega strah od vlastite otvorenosti. Na primjer, briga za omladinu, kao najotvoreniji socijalni sloj, pretvara se u strah od vlastite omladine; briga za njenu budućnost pretvara se u strah od njene sadašnjosti. Vrhunac te bojznosti je u stvari strah da ne budu žigosane kao zatvorene, zbog čega njihova otvorenost ima cesto hipokritski karakter. Ksenofobične a otvorene kulture pod otvorenošću najčešće podrazumijevaju misionarski odnos prema drugim kulturama. Otvorenost u njihovoj percepciji je jednosmjerna. Druge treba učiti kako se koristi topla voda, druge treba učiti demokratiji itd. Misionarski otvorene kulture su ili otvoreno misionarske, u slučajevima kada implementiraju svoje kulturne obrasce u drugim kulturama, ili hipokritski otvorene u slučaju kada primaju strance u svoju vlastitu kulturu. Asimilaciju drugih negiraju, ali je najradije označavaju eufemizmom

integracija.(5) Efekat otvorenosti, međutim, može biti obrnut. Ksenofobične kulture su, naime, manje homogene i manje kohezivne i stoga više izložene i ranjive u odnosu na “superiornije” kulture. Ovakve kulture su, i pored svih mjera, “žrtva” neželjenog i nepredvidivog procesa multikulturalizacije u vlastitoj sredini.

3. Represivnost/agresivnost kultura - Kulture nisu samo homogene i ksenofobične nego se katkada razvijaju u *represivne* – kako u odnosu prema drugima tako i, *autorepresivne*, u odnosu prema samima sebi – puritativne kulture. Kulturni puritanizam nije samo oblik autorepresivnosti jedne kulture, nego je i logična posljedica represivnosti u odnosu na druge kulture. Represivne kulture su najčešće posljedica svoje ksenofobičnosti. Nedovoljno homogene i samopouzdanе, ksenofobične kulture ili postaju agresivno otvorene ili se radije opredjeljuju za zatvaranje čak i po cijenu odricanja od mogućnosti da se utiče na druge. Ni represivne kulture, međutim, ne mogu biti označene kao zatvorene. Ali (auto)represivne kulture su u stanju da se samo ograničeno otvore prema drugima. Njihov kulturni puritanizam nikada neće prihvatiti multiplicirani identitet, ali izbjegavaju i kulturni kontakt. One i kao takve, represivne, još uvijek mogu biti otvorene za selektivnu recepciju pojedinih kulturnih elemenata; one često znaju i da uživaju u egzotičnosti drugih, i upoređivanju s njima, ali samo kao još jednom dokazu njihove vlastite samodovoljnosti, inkompatibilnosti s drugima, superiornosti ili, najradije, ovisnosti drugih. Represivne kulture pretendiraju da izgledaju otvorene, one svoj strah od stranog nastoje prikriti svojom agresivnošću, a najčešće odsustvo vlastite homogenosti i kohezivnosti pretvaraju u otvorenu autorepresivnost prema svemu što ne zadovoljava kriterije njihovog kulturnog puritanizma. Ove kulture najčešće svoj “superiorni” odnos prema drugima ne žele ni prikriti asimilacijom i najradije se opredjeljuju za ostre civilizacijske, kulturne, vjerske ili nacionalne granice koje će nas držati na distanci. Endogamija represivnih kultura nužno vodi u autorepresivnost i introvertiranu agresivnost. Najveća opasnost za njihov identitet ne dolazi od drugih, nego njihovog straha od drugih – multikulturalizma iznad svega.

3. TIPOVI MULTIKULTURALIZMA

Postoji više tipova ili oblika u kojima se multikulturalizam, to stanje više od jedne i stanje više od zbira dvije ili više kultura, ukratko stanje *multipliciranog* kulturnog identiteta, ispoljava. Mogući tipovi multikulturalizma su sljedeći:

1. *Marginalni multikulturalizam* (nastao na granici dvije kulture ili na tačkama dodira pojedinih socijalnih grupa s drugim kulturama);
2. *Intra-multikulturalizam* (nastao dubokim podjelama unutar jedne homogene i često ksenofobične kulture, katkada nakon strasne netrpeljivosti i agresivnosti);
3. *Slojeviti (stratificirani)* ili *sub-multikulturalizam* (nastao dubokim socijalnim raslojavanjem unutar jedne kulture, ali u kome se zadržava hijerarhijski odnos između sub-kultura);
4. *Minoritetski multikulturalizam* (u kome dvije ili, češće, više kultura stoje u međusobnom manifestno većinsko-manjinskom i, dakle, neravnopravnom odnosu, ali u kome samo manjinske grupe poprimaju multikulturno stanje dvostrukog identiteta, dok većinska ili dominantna kulturna grupa zadržava isključivo svoj identitet i nastoji da integrira i asimilira manjinske);
5. *Amalgamski (ili balkanski ili bosanski) multikulturalizam* (u kome dvije ili više kultura amalgamiraju svoje identitete u jedan zajednički, ali zadržavaju i razvijaju vlastite distinktivne identitete)

Tipovi multikulturalizma mogu da se označe i stepenima u razvitku ili istorijskim fazama multikulturalizma. Ali, to nikako ne podrazumjeva da su ti stepeni ili faze međusobno viši ili niži. To će reći da multikulturalizam, tj. sposobnost usvajanja multipliciranog kulturnog identiteta, uopće ne treba smatrati višim u odnosu na kulturni purizam. Isto tako, bilo bi pogrešno reći da su samo pojedini tipovi multikulturalizma karakteristični za određene kulture. Jedno društvo ili jedna kultura može istovremeno da egzistira kroz različite tipove odnosa prema drugim kulturama, ili različite tipove multikulturalizma.

1. Marginalni multikulturalizam - Pod marginalnim multikulturalizmom podrazumjevamo onu vrstu otvorenosti kultura jednih prema drugima koja se zbiva na njihovim kulturnim, tj. socijalnim granicama. To znači da se marginalni multikulturalizam događa na periferiji ali i u samom središtu jedne kulture. Globalizacija je učinila marginalni multikulturalizam gotovo univerzalnim. Granice, kako *geo-političke* tako i *socijalne*, još uvijek postoje - nastojeći održati homogenitet kultura - ali se i prekoračuju. Stapanje s drugim kulturama događa se, međutim, najprije na marginama. Katkada geo-političkim ali često i socijalnim. Na geo-političkoj, obično *državnoj* granici jedne kulture događa se nezaustavljivi kontakt s drugim kulturama koji katkada ima za posljedicu dvostruki kulturni identitet s obe strane granice. Kulturni centar može biti veoma homogen, čak ksenofobičan prema susjednoj kulturi, pa i represivan prema vlastitoj ukoliko ova pokazuje isuviše naklonosti prema susjedima, ali se na margini unatoč tome događa proces multikulturnog stapanja. Na margini druge vrste, *socijalnoj*, na kojoj pojedini socijalni slojevi ili starosne grupe pokazuju više naklonosti prema strancima i njihovim kulturama, također se događa nešto što nije samo ko-egzistencija dvije kulture. Neki socijalni slojevi, u inace otvorenim ali homogenim kulturama više su "ranjivi" na strane kulture i manje "imuni" na uticaje izvana. Čak i kada nisu izloženi otvorenoj represiji ili izopćavanju iz vlastite kulture oni, s jedne strane, doprinose homogenizaciji vlastite kulture, a s druge izazivaju samoizolaciju. Neke starosne grupe, ne samo mladi, mogu također biti nosioci marginalnog multikulturalizma. Zbog toga te grupe, i socijalne i starosne, mogu postati marginalne u vlastitoj kulturi. Ili čak žigosane.

2. Intra-multikulturalizam - Pod intra-multikulturalizmom podrazumjevamo takvo stanje dvostrukog kulturnog identiteta koje nije nastalo iz kontakta dvije distinktivne kulture, nego cijepanjem jedne jedinstvene kulture. Paradigmatičan primjer ovog tipa multikulturalizma je nekoliko evropskih kršćanskih društava koja su preostala nakon sukoba unutar Katoličke crkve, i Reformacijom bila duboko podijeljena na protestantsku i katoličku kulturnu grupu. Ta društva su nastavila egzistirati tolerantno kulturno distinktivna, ali i dijeliti zajednički kulturni identitet. Rečeno na drugi način, ovo isto bi moglo glasiti: da su ta društva zadržala zajednički kršćanski/etnički identitet ali i priznala duboku podjelu na protestantski i katolički identitet. Prema tome, ma koliko se 'nation-makers' trudili da uspostave nacionalnu

homogenost, razlika između tih kultura ostaje osjetna.

U Bosni je intra-multikulturalna tendencija također prisutna ali na drugoj, etničkoj osnovi. Nekada jedinstvena etnička grupa, i njoj korespondentna kultura, mada duboko podijeljena religijskim identitetima čak i prije dolaska islama, podijeljena je tek u drugoj polovini XIX vijeka i na nacionalnoj osnovi, dograđenoj na već postojeću religijsku distinktivnost. Ma koliko se nacionalisti među njima trudili da dokazu i pothrane međusobnu distinktivnost, i ma koliko njihove *nacionalne* kulture bile uistinu divergentne, Bosanci, tj. i Bošnjaci i Srbi i Hrvati, dijele još uvijek i zajednički *etnički* kulturni identitet. Neki među njima, često vrlo ekstremni, otkriju to tek kada odu u Hrvatsku, Srbiju ili, čak, Tursku, i shvate da su novi domaćini distinktivniji od njihovih starih bošnjačkih, hrvatskih, odnosno srpskih komšija. Kao što je Reformacija proizvela kulturnu bifurkaciju unutar kršćanstva, tako se u Bosni dogodila nacionalna trifurkacija iz nekada zajedničkog i jedinstvenog etničkog korijena.

Intra-multikulturalizam je, upravo zbog svog zajedničkog porijekla, često neželjen i kao takav izvor uzajamnih predrasuda, žigosanja, tenzija i sukoba. Ono što ga čini izvorom tenzija i konflikata nije velika distinktivnost između zajedničkog i posebnih identiteta, nego upravo njihova bliskost. Posebni nacionalni identiteti koji se trude da budu što distinktivniji međusobno, neprestano su podsjećani zajedničkim identitetom da im to ipak ne polazi tako lako za rukom.

3. Slojeviti/stratifikacijski ili sub-multikulturalizam - Kao i u prethodnom slučaju tako i kod slojevitog ili sub-multikulturalizma se radi o jednoj jedinstvenoj kulturi kao zajedničkom izvoru nastanka dva ili više sub-kulturalnih identiteta. U jednoj subkulturalno podijeljenoj kulturi ljudi dijele kako specifični sub-kulturalni tako i zajednički kulturni identitet. Ono što razlikuje intra-multikulturalizam od sub-multikulturalizma jeste to što se u drugom slučaju radi o identitetima koji su međusobno subordinirani, što se za intra-multikulturalizam ne može reći i čak izbjegava reći, ili pak kaže ali sa očitom predrasudom. Iako se može postaviti pitanje adekvatnosti termina multikulturalizam, s obzirom da se radi o sub-kulturama, ipak je moguće naći opravdane razloge. Sub-kulture mogu biti distinktivnije međusobno nego u odnosu na sasvim posebne kulture. Kastinski podijeljena društva su svakako najdrastičniji slučaj ovakvog multikulturalizma. Sva klasna društva su također sub-multikulturalna. U mnogim slučajevima sub-multikulturalne su čak pojedine

socijalne klase.

Najtipičniji je, ipak, slučaj odnosa između ruralnih i urbanih sub-kultura u izvjesnim društvima. Podjela na grad i selo je jedna od najstarijih i najtrajnijih socijalno-kulturnih podjela. Oštre razlike koje su se taložile stoljećima nije mogao izbrisati samo jedan novi socijalno-ekonomski sistem. Nije to uspjelo ni kapitalizmu ni socijalizmu. U nekim kulturama, zahvaljujući specifičnom egalitarističkom socijalnom nasljeđu, ova sub-kulturalna podjela nije tako oštra i stoga nema karakter multikulturalizma. Međutim, u društvima koja su imala specifičnu prošlost i duboke socijalne podjele, podjela na grad i selo ima uistinu sub-kulturni karakter. Jazovi koji ih razdvajaju su katkada tako duboki da su nerazumljivi i neprihvatljivi za ljude iz drugih kultura, posebno onih gdje taj jaz nije tako oštar i razlika između sub-kultura nije tako uočljiva.

Pred dubokom podjelom između ruralne i urbane sub-kulture zbunio se u Bosni i sam nacionalizam. U trenutku kada su se etničke grupe, u strahu jedna od druge, nacionalno homogenizirale, shvatile su u jednom času da oni drugi i nisu bili tako distinktivni koliko su im se tuđim učinili vlastiti “seljaci” ili pak “građani”. Tako se događalo još u toku rata da su u nekoliko gradova pod srpskom kontrolom Srbi trazili da im se vrate “njihovi Muslimani”, u nemogućnosti da se homogeniziraju s vrlo distinktivnim “vlastitim seljacima”. Na bošnjačkoj strani su se u nekim mjestima urbani Bošnjaci nakon rata počeli identificirati s “braćom bilo koje vjere i ideologije” samo da bi se distancirali od sve dominantnijih sunarodnjaka sa sela. U Čapljini, gradu koji je postao “čisto” hrvatski nakon genocida nad Bošnjacima, jedan je Hrvat morao tokom rata provesti godinu dana u hrvatskom logoru (dvostruko duže od Bosnjaka), zato što se suprotstavljao izgonu Muslimana iz grada i tvrdio za svoje sunarodnike da tjeraju “one koji su im civilizaciju i kulturu donijeli”.

Sub-multikulturalizmu je svojstven odnos subordinacije između pojedinih sub-kultura, ali je neupitno, bez obzira na osnovu (etničku, vjersku ili socijalnu) subkulturalnosti, postojanje zajedničkog identiteta. Dvostruki kulturni identitet, bez obzira na subordinaciju među sub-kulturama, je svojstven svima i dakle univerzalan. U slučaju multikulturalizma koji nastaje na osnovi podjele na urbanu i ruralnu sub-kulturu to znaci da nisu samo seljaci ti koji, zadržavajući svoju ruralnu kulturu, uspostavljaju i zajedničku, nego su to i građani. U slučaju Bosne, čija je urbana kultura doživjela barem tri soka u posljednjih sto godina, gotovo da je

urbana kultura potpuno nestala i asimilirana od sela. Bosna je danas puna anegdota o ponašanju ljudi sa sela u gradu. To je skoro jedino još preostalo od gradskog duha. A nekada su se u Bosni pričale anegdote o ponašanju ljudi iz grada u selu.

4. *Minoritetski multikulturalizam* - Pod minoritetskim multikulturalizmom podrazumijevamo takav oblik odnosa dvije ili, češće, više kultura koje stoje u međusobnom većinsko-manjinskom i, dakle, neravnopravnom odnosu, u kome samo manjinske grupe poprimaju multikulturalno stanje dvostrukog identiteta, dok većinska ili dominantna kulturna grupa zadržava isključivo svoj identitet i nastoji da integrira i asimilira manjinske. Ovakav tip multikulturalizma nije fenomen novijeg datuma ali je u posljednjih nekoliko decenija postao obilježje razvijenih industrijskih društava Zapada. Može se govoriti o dva podtipa minoritetskog multikulturalizma. U prvom, manjine su starosjedelačke, bilo da su tu dosle kada i dominantna grupa, bilo da su zatečene. U drugom slučaju, radi se o manjinama sa distinktivnim kulturama koje su pristigle u novije vrijeme bilo kao rezultat ekonomske ili političke migracije. U oba slučaja novi zajednički kulturni identitet grade isključivo manjine i dvostruki kulturni identitet je svojstven samo njima.

Dominantna kultura domaćina može biti receptivna za mnoge kulturne elemente iz manjinske kulture; kultura većine je čak otvorena za kontakt s kulturom manjine u cjelini. Ali, nikada dominantna kultura većine neće prihvatiti da dijeli zajednički kulturni identitet s manjinama. Tolerancija je očita, respekt se ukazuje, čak uživa u pojedinim kulturnim elementima. Ali, ništa od ovoga se ne može nazvati multikulturalizmom. Ovaj postoji samo na jednoj strani i zato i nosi atribut minoritetni. Bošnjacke izbjeglice u Skandinaviji, kao i u drugim zemljama, i kao i druge useljeničke grupe, su bili oduševljeni norveškim raspoloženjem za bosansku kuhinju. Svi su htjeli jesti bosansku pitu, burek posebno, ali ne znam da je i jedna Norvežanka naučila razvijati jufku i sterati burek! S druge strane, mnoge Bošnjakinje su već odavno odustale od pravljenja bosanske (turske) kafe i navikle se na bljutavu, tanku, bezličnu kafu iz automata, za koju se ne može reći ni da je norveška, jer je globalna. Obilježavanje “muslimanskog Božića” postala je uobičajena navika među Turcima u Njemačkoj, na primjer.⁽⁶⁾ Najveći broj Norvežana ili Nijemaca, međutim, i ne zna sta je Bajram.

Minoritetni multikulturalizam je u stvari ili proces asimilacije/integracije manjinskih kultura u dominantnu ili pak proces nastajanja novih sub-kultura i kao

takav nužno vodi hijerarhizaciji među kulturama. Ono što razlikuje minoritetni od subkulturalizma jeste to što kod minoritetnog multikulturalizma nedostaje zajednička osnova. Stoga minoritetni multikulturalizam ima malo izgleda da se razvije u bilo koji drugi tip. Minoritetni multikulturalizam, u uslovima represivne nacionalizacije, koja se eufemistički zove naturalizacija, ima malo izgleda da bude održiv.

5. Amalgamski (ili balkanski ili bosanski) multikulturalizam - Proces amalgamacije je, inače, dobivanje zlata i srebra ekstrakcijom iz njihovih rudača s pomocu topljenja u živi. U procesu amalgamskog tipa multikulturalizma radi se o nečemu sličnom ali, kao i kod zlata i srebra (sjetimo se samo mita o kralju Midasu!), ne treba izgubiti iz vida ni ambivalentni karakter multikulturalizma.

a) Amalgamacija najboljeg - Pod amalgamskim multikulturalizmom, dakle, podrazumjevamo proces nastajanja dvostrukog ili multipliciranog kulturnog identiteta u kome se u novorazvijenom, zajedničkom identitetu izdvajaju najbolje crte posebnih identiteta. Drugim riječima, ono što je najbolje u kulturama drugih se prihvata i amalgamira s najboljim u vlastitoj kulturi, kao preferentnim za druge. Nazivamo ga i balkanskim ili bosanskim (atribut jugoslovenski je također bio moguć u vrijeme kada je Jugoslavija postojala u svom autentičnom i autohtonom obliku) iz jednostavnog razloga. Budući da na Balkanu, kao i u Bosni kao samo jednom užem milijeju, ne postoji socijalna grupa koja ima apsolutnu većinu, zbog čega niko nije ni u manjini – za razliku od većine drugih multikulturalnih sredina - rezultat tog procesa je, naravno, ne samo potpuno novi, nego i, očekivati je, viši kulturni identitet.

Naravno, nejasno je i svakako upitno čta je to viši kulturni identitet. Na to pitanje nije lako odgovoriti. Možda nemoguće. Ali čak i ako je tako to ne znači da određena gradacija ne postoji. Ona se mora priznati čak i po cijenu da ju je nemoguće precizno definirati. Pouzdano se može reći da u svakom kulturnom identitetu postoje preferirani, dakle viši i niži elementi; jednako, postoje i preferirani i manje preferirani, pa i nepoželjni kulturni identiteti. Smatramo da na Balkanu, zbog pomenutog specifičnog spleta okolnosti, postoji ta naklonost prema drugima i čak preferiranje zajedničkog. Nigdje kao na Balkanu multikulturalizam nije tako uočljiv. Nigdje kao tu se ne toleriraju drugi, ne respektiraju drugačiji i, najzad, nigdje

se ne zna uživati u tuđem kao na Balkanu. S obzirom na kvalitativnu razliku novonastalog zajedničkog identiteta u odnosu na svaki posebni to i nije neobično. U periodima kulturne otvorenosti amalgamski multikulturalizam je paradigmatičan, najviši i može se reći najpoželjniji tip multikulturalizma.

Ipak se, s pravom i neizbježno, odmah postavlja pitanje: ako je multikulturalizam tu dostigao tako visok stepen, zašto su onda tenzije među različitim identitetima na Balkanu, u Jugoslaviji, a posebno u Bosni, intenzivnije – do mržnje, a sukobi oštriji – do okrutnosti? Da li su to tenzije i sukobi između veoma distinktivnih, što je eksplicitno u ideji o sukobu civilizacija (7), ili se radi o tenzijama i sukobima između veoma bliskih, srodnih identiteta? I najzad, ako se u ovom slučaju radi o tenzijama i sukobima između posebnih (kulturnih, etničkih, vjerskih itd.) identiteta i zajedničkog (bosanskog, jugoslovenskog ili balkanskog), ili zbog zajedničkog identiteta, onda se nužno postavlja pitanje odgovornosti multikulturalizma samog i njegovog *raison d'être*.

Istraživači najradije, i bez griže savjesti, te tenzije i sukobe, sve do posljednjeg u Bosni, nazivaju etničkim, vjerskim ili civilizacijskim. (8) Produbljenija analiza, međutim, uvijek može dokazati da se ni jedan od tih sukoba ne može označiti ni jednim od ovih atributa. (9) Štaviše, ni jedan se sukob kao takav ne može definirati ni jednim od ovih atributa. Čak i kada bi jedni naspram drugih stajali svih 8.527.800 Srba i 4.633.300 Hrvata, koliko ih je bilo u Jugoslaviji prema posljednjem popisu stanovništva iz 1991. godine, to ne bi bio dovoljan indikator da se njihov sukob nazove etničkim. Tenzije na Balkanu nisu religijske, iako religijske granice – između islama i hrišćanstva, ili katoličanstva i pravoslavlja – idu posred poluostrva; socijalni jazovi, koji na Balkanu postoje kao i u drugim dijelovima svijeta, uopće nisu najdublji među etničkim grupama, mada nigdje kao ovdje ne postoji takva koncentracija velikog broja naroda na tako malom prostoru; najmanje tacno i najpovršnije je sukobe na Balkanu nazivati civilizacijskim, unatoc činjenici da je Balkan istovremeno i istorijska metropola nekih od najznacajnijih svjetskih civilizacija i periferija na kojoj se susrecu druge. Pa ipak, tenzije i sukobi koji potresaju Balkan su u osnovi kulturno utemeljeni.

Na Balkanu se, naime, i pored tako visoko dostignutog stepena multikulturalizma, i pored dakle amalgamiranog zajedničkog (dvostrukog, pa i trostrukog u slučaju Bosne) kulturnog identiteta, periodi saradnje, harmonije i sloge smjenjuju s neobično iracionalnim vremenima u kojima se kidaju najprirodnije veze,

u kojima haos postaje sistem, a duboki jazovi razdvajaju i najsirodnije. Dvadeseti vijek je bio upravo vrijeme u kome je Balkan postao paradigma onoga što je suprotno multikulturalizmu. Stoga nije neobično da je savremeni svijet pod “Balkanom” usvojio sinonim suprotan toleranciji, jedinstvu i saradnji. Takva predstava i predrasuda o Balkanu je razumljiva, ali nije tačna.⁽¹⁰⁾ Jednako je, međjutim, netačna i predstava i predrasuda o Balkanu kao idiličnom, tolerantnom, multikulturalnom stjecištu različitih naroda, religija, kultura. Čini se da je ispravno jedino reći: tačne su obe pod uslovom da uključuju i onu drugu, sasvim suprotnu. I tek pod tim uslovom možemo reći da nisu ni predstave ni predrasude. Balkan je, dakle, mjesto kako ksenofobije tako i ksenofilije, i nacionalne isključivosti i multikulturalizma, krstaških ratova i ekumenizma, genocida ili “etničkih čišćenja” i - etnickog promiskuiteta. Zato ga je teško shvatiti – čak i kada se prihvata.

Stoljeća koja su prethodila dvadesetom bila su ono vrijeme u kome je Balkan dostigao najviši stepen u razvitku multikulturalizma i pokazao čovječanstvu mogućnost ne samo ko-egzistencije između distinktivnih kultura nego i mogućnost dualnog identiteta, dakle mogućnost ko-egzistencije između posebnih kulturnih identiteta, na jednoj, i zajedničkog identiteta na drugoj strani. U Bosni su, na primjer, pored posebnih etničkih ili religijskih identiteta – recimo, bošnjačkog, hrvatskog i srpskog, postojali i bosanski i jugoslovenski, dakle zajednički identiteti. Niko ne može poreći da bosanski franjevci nisu dijelili i hrvatski i bosanski identitet istovremeno.⁽¹¹⁾ Mora se također priznati da nigdje kao u Bosni nije jugoslovenski identitet bio tako prihvaćen u periodu druge Jugoslavije, unatoč činjenici da joj je “Jugoslavija” onako okrutno kasnije uzvratila. I danas je Tito, kao simbol tog jugoslovenstva, dio tog identiteta više nego bilo gdje drugdje.⁽¹²⁾ Slično se može reći i za ranije periode, bilo onaj otomanski ili austro-ugarski. Fes je, na primjer, kao jedan kulturni elemenat koji vodi porijeklo iz Maroka i nema nikakve veze ni sa islamskom ni sa turskom kulturom, dospio do Bosne difuzijom kroz tadašnje Otomansko carstvo, bio žestoko odbijan od strane muslimana u Bosni, jer se konzervativni Bošnjaci nisu htjeli odreći turbana. Zatim je bio opće prihvaćen - nosili su ga i Srbi i Hrvati, čak i katolički svećenici⁽¹³⁾, da bi danas Bošnjaci bili, možda, među posljednjim muslimanima koji još smatraju fes obilježjem svoga identiteta. Bosna uopće nije balkanski izuzetak; ona je samo paradigmataska za Balkan. Ljudi iz različitih kultura (ma šta pod jednom kulturom podrazumjevali), vjera i etničkih grupa, su uvijek, pored svog posebnog bili otvoreni za druge, šire i

zajedničke identitete. Makedonski identitet nije samo specifičan po svom multikulturalnom porijeklu, nego i po svom multikulturalnom opredjeljenju. Pored, razumljivo, promakedonski opredjeljenih Makedonaca među njima je bilo probugarski, prosrpski i čak proturski orijentiranih; ipak je među Makedoncima uvijek bilo onih multikulturalno opredjeljenih: opredjeljeni za širi jugoslovenski i balkanski identitet, nisu odustajali od svog vlastitog makedonskog identiteta.(14)

Otkuda ovo dvostruko, ambivalentno balkansko multikulturalno iskustvo? Šta je to što određuje da se na Balkanu, u Jugoslaviji, Bosni smjenjuju periodi otvorenosti prema drugim kulturama - do ksenofilije, s periodima u kojima se pojedine kulture zatvaraju u sebe - do ksenofobičnosti i represivnosti? Zbog čega oni koji su dosegli multikulturalizam najvišeg tipa, onaj u kome se zajednički identitet preferira u odnosu na vlastiti, posebni, u jednom trenutku, gotovo preko noći, počinja, artifičijelno i katkada karikaturalno, graditi posebne identitete samo da bi se razlikovali od drugih?

b) Najgore – nusprodukt amalgamacije - Nigdje se kao tu, na Balkanu, ne može uočiti tako jasno i druga strana ambivalentnosti multikulturalizma. Tačno je da se nigdje kao tu ljudi nisu u tolikoj mjeri identificirali kroz zajedničku amalgamiranu kulturu. Ali, nigdje kao na Balkanu ljudi nisu svjesni superiornosti zajedničkog identiteta. U periodima saradnje, harmonije i sloge, zajednički identitet se preferira, vlastiti distinktivni katkada potiskuje. Ideja jugoslovenstva je rođena u svom autentičnom obliku kod Hrvata; identifikacija sa srpstvom podijelila je crnogorski narod na one koji su se odriicali crnogorstva kao posebnog identiteta i one koji su se odriicali i jugoslovenstva samo da ne budu identificirani sa Srbima; Bošnjaci su se, u vrijeme kada nisu mogli biti ni to što jesu ni Jugosloveni, opredjeljivali i kao Srbi, i kao Hrvati, pa i kao Slovenci i Crnogorci.(15) Pisac, i nobelovac, Ivo Andrić je svom hrvatskom, bosanskom i jugoslovenskom identitetu dodao i - srpski; bošnjački pisac Meša Selimović se opredjeljivao kao Srbin; srpski pisac Mirko Kovač je, ne mireći se sa srpskim nacionalizmom, otišao u – Hrvatsku. U Beogradu je prije posljednjeg rata latinica dominirala u javnoj upotrebi nad ćirilicom; bošnjački nacionalisti su u toku rata zazirali od ćirilice i ekavice, mada je originalno bosansko pismo – *bosančica* – također bilo ćirilčno, a ekavskom varijantom bosanskog govori se i u nekim dijelovima Bosne. Među pristalicama beogradskog režima, vjerovatno identificiran s jugoslovenstvom, ostao je do kraja i poznati albanski glumac s

Kosova Bekim Fehmiu(16); među Srbima koji su se tokom bosanskog rata priključili bošnjačkoj strani, bilo je i Srba – ambasadora Jugoslavije. Neki su se intelektualci među bosanskim Hrvatima, ipak vratili u Bosnu nakon što su u Zagrebu ili Splitu shvatili da tamo ne spadaju; oni su sada među najoštrijim kritičarima hrvatskog nacionalizma u Bosni itd. Ukratko, čak i u najodsudnijim trenucima za zajednički identitet, najtragičnijim periodima multikulturalizma, postojali su oni koji ga se nisu odricali. Upravo u periodima podjela i rascjepa zajednički amalgamirani identitet je pokazivao ne samo svoju održivost i imunitet nego i superiornost.

Međutim, i u periodima cvjetanja multikulturalizma odnosi među pojedinim kulturama nisu bili bez tenzija. Za analitičkog pesimistu uvijek je bilo moguće detektirati potencijalne konflikte. Enigma balkanskog multikulturalizma bila je tako zbunjujuća: za strance ali i za Bosance, Jugoslovene, Balkance.

Amalgamski multikulturalizam jeste produkt najboljeg iz posebnih kultura. Ali šta je sa onim sto je preostalo u svakoj od tih posebnih kultura? Da li su, naime, svi sposobni da prihvate to zajedničko i bolje? Sta se dogadjalo sa onima koji nisu mogli preko granice vlastite kulture? Ono što preostaje od multikulturalizma, a preostaje od svakog, čak i amalgamiranog, jeste *nacionalizam*.(17) To je ona druga strana ambivalentnosti multikulturalizma. Nesposoban da prihvati zajednički identitet, nacionalizam, u stvari, nije otvoren ni za identitet drugih kao takav. Nacionalizam je u dvostrukom sukobu: s posebnim kulturama drugih i nastajućim zajedničkim identitetom. Sukob u Jugoslaviji nije bio samo sukob između različitih kulturnih identiteta, vrlo ili malo distinktivnih, svejedno, nego i sukob sa zajedničkim identitetom. To nije bio samo sukob između srpskog i hrvatskog, na primjer, nego i sa jugoslovenskim, sa obe strane. Nacionalizam je samo nastojao da predstavi taj sukob kao sukob između vrlo distinktivnih, između onih koji su za zajednički identitet i onih koji su za posebne identitete. Hrvatskom nacionalisti nije smetalo samo sve što je srpsko nego i jugoslovenski identitet, dakle *implicite* i svi drugi posebni identiteti; čim je Hrvatska dobila nezavisnost do rascjepa je došlo i prema Slovencima, a da ne govorimo prema Bošnjacima. Srpskom nacionalisti nikada nije bilo stalo do jugoslovenstva; on je uvijek mrzio hrvatski, kao i druge identitete, zato što ne priznaju srpski kao jugoslovenski identitet. Srpski nacionalist je mrzio ne samo hrvatskog nacionalistu, koji je mrzio njega, nego i projugoslovenskog Hrvata. Danas kada je, nakon odlaska sa srpske scene

hipokritskog jugoslovenstva, srpski nacionalizam pokazao svoje pravo lice, njemu nije stalo ni do Crne Gore, preferirajući neadekvatnom imenu Jugoslavija adekvatnije – Srbija. S druge strane, budući da hrvatsko-srpski, i bilo koji drugi, nacionalista nije u stanju da se bori protiv zajedničkog identiteta ni u jeziku ni u košarci, jer je superiornost očita, njemu treba srpski, odnosno hrvatski nacionalista da bi dokazao svoju superiornost.

Problem, dakle, nije u zajedničkom identitetu nego u onome što je preostalo od posebnih identiteta nakon što je nastao zajednički. Ali, to još uvijek ne znači da je problem izvan multikulturalizma. Nacionalizam je, ipak, fenomen koji prati proces multikulturalizma. (18) U periodima nacionalizma, tj. periodima u kojima posebni (etnički, vjerski, katkada regionalni) kulturni identiteti postaju zatvoreni, ta svijest o superiornosti zajedničkog identiteta u odnosu na uži, nacionalni, ili vjerski ili bilo koji drugi, koja je do jučer bila osnovom uzajamnog približavanja, postaje sada uzrokom otpora prema svemu zajedničkom, svemu tuđem i čak negiranja vlastitog ukoliko je ono prihvaćeno od drugih. Nacionalista uspostavlja granice, kako stare koje su nekada bile izbrisane, tako i nove koje nikada nisu postojale. On se plasi upoređivanja s drugima. Strah od zajedničkog je strah od superiornog i boljeg. Strah od boljeg i superiornijeg je samo dokaz vlastite inferiornosti i mizernosti. Kulturne granice samo služe da se uspostave političke granice kako bi se zaštitila nacionalna prosječnost ili čak proglasila genijalnošću.(19) Nacionalisti se posebno plaše ičeg zajedničkog. Kompleks manje vrijednosti tjera ih da ga se riješe, i zato postaju agresivni prema tom višem i ulaze u sukob s njim. Nije Jugoslavija nestala zbog toga što su Srbi i Hrvati veoma distinktivni nego zato što su i jedni i drugi bili bolji dok su bili i Jugosloveni, i za sebe i za druge. Jugoslovenstvo nije nestalo ni zato što su srpstvo i hrvatstvo bili potisnuti, nego je jugoslovenstvo smetalo srpskim i hrvatskim nacionalistima zato što je u njemu učestvovalo i bošnjaštvo, i slovenstvo, i crnogorstvo, i makedonstvo, i albanstvo itd., i tek kao takvo bilo bolje. I samo dotle dok su u jugoslovenskom identitetu učestvovali mnogi ono je bilo superiorno. U trenutku kada se srpstvo počelo izdavati za jugoslovenstvo ono niti je bilo jugoslovenstvo ni superiorno. Isto vrijedi i za bosanski ili balkanski multikulturalni identitet.

Karakterističan je slučaj Bosne još jednom. Predrasude, ili namjerno isfabricirane predstave, o “drevnoj mržnji” (20), ali i one o “prirodnom saveznistvu” pojedinih etničkih grupa, otpadaju već kada se pogleda kada su i pod kojim

uslovima Bošnjaci, Hrvati i Srbi u Bosni bili u sukobu ili pak savezništvu. Za vrijeme Turske, u kojoj su muslimanski Bosnjaci bili povlasteni, pravoslavni Srbi i katolički Hrvati su biti saveznici; za vrijeme Austro-Ugarske, prihvaćenoj od katoličkih Hrvata u Bosni, antiaustrijsku i čak protursku alijansu su pravili Bošnjaci i Srbi(!), koji su čak preferirali sultanov suverenitet keiserovom, a za vrijeme prve Jugoslavije, koja je svakako bila (malkice!) naklonjena pravoslavnim Srbima, doslo je do približavanja Bošnjaka i Hrvata. I to je, u stvari, istina - rečena ukratko - o “drevnoj” mržnji i “prirodnom” savezništvu. Ona se izbjegava među “zapadnim liderima u njihovim javnim komentarima o Bosanskom ratu” već i zbog toga što ona ukazuje i na izvore – kako mržnje tako i savezništava među balkanskim narodima.(21) Na mjesto mržnje došlo je “bratstvo-jedinstvo” u vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rata i Druge Jugoslavije; “prirodno savezništvo” raspalo se kao balon od sapunice u sukobu Hrvata i Bošnjaka ratne 1993, jednako kao što su se raspadala i ranija savezništva. Mržnje i savezništva u Bosni, Jugoslaviji i na Balkanu nisu ni vječna ni prirodna. Ni njihovi uzroci nisu ni vječni ni prirodni. Zato su i pomirenja opet moguća, i samo su ona vječna i prirodna. Doduše, za pomirenje su ovoga puta potrebni istina i kazna. Ovog puta nema ni Partije ni Tita. I danas bi Tito, nakon svega što se dogodilo tokom posljednjeg rata, vjerovatno, rekao: “Dajte mi vlast (tj. Partiju) i TV i napravit ću “bratstvo-jedinstvo” za šest mjeseci!” Ili bi, možda, ipak, kao na onom sarajevskom ratnom grafitu, u kome ga je neki Sarajlija ocajnički pozivao u pomoć: “Tito, vrati se!” – umoran i od Bosne i Jugoslavije i Balkana, radije rekao: “Nisam lud!” Nema nade da će se Tito, Partija ili “bratstvo-jedinstvo” više ikada vratiti. Važnije je nadati se da Amerikanci budu dovoljno ljudi da tamo (ovdje) ostanu sto duže.

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Высокие технологии и наука

Дедюлина М.А.

Annotation

In the given essay, the specificity of interaction of science and high technologies is given in more detail, having all the time in mind that the contemporary *socium* cannot identify itself properly without what we know as 'high tech'.

Key words: HI-TECH, social topology, technoscience, society, science.

Сегодня современный социум не представляет себя без Hi-Tech. Изучение и анализ этих технологий с каждым годом с одной стороны, требует очень серьезных финансовых вложений, а с другой стороны, ученых и профессионалов, создающих и внедряющих их практически во все сферы жизнедеятельности общества. Актуальность данного исследования заключается в том, что в философской литературе пока данная тема практически не исследована, начиная с анализа дефиниции «высокие технологии» и заканчивая методологией их исследования и оценки последствий для человечества их присутствия и воздействия на биологические, материальные и аксиологические ее составляющие. В данной статье нами предлагается поиск возможных методологических оснований исследования высоких технологий в рамках философии науки и техники.

Дефиниция высокие технологии пока еще недостаточно осмыслена и определена. В нашем случае, мы под высокими технологиями будем понимать специфическую разновидность технологий, отраслей промышленности и изделий, которые получили название «наукоемких» или «высокотехнологичных» (high technology). Во-первых, в данном случае, технология - совокупность методов и приемов, используемых на всех этапах проектирования и производства конкретного вида изделий (вещей). Во-

вторых, наукоемкими[□] технологиями являются такие технологии, включающие в себя объемы ИР, превышающие среднее значение этого показателя технологий в определенной области экономики. В-третьих, продукцией высоких технологий являются изделия (вещи) в себестоимости или в добавленной стоимости которых затраты на ИР выше, чем в среднем по изделиям отраслей данной сферы экономики. Естественно возникает вопрос: Какие отрасли производства можно по праву назвать наукоемкими. Так в 90-е годы XX века Организация экономического сотрудничества и развития (ОЭСР), куда входят все, передовые промышленно развитые страны выделила всего четыре отрасли высоких технологий: 1) аэрокосмическая, 2) производство компьютеров и конторского оборудования, 3) производство электронных средств коммуникаций и 4) фармацевтическая промышленность. Между тем, в то время ряд новых наукоемких отраслей (производство новых материалов, высокоточного оружия, биопродукции и др.) не попали в перечень в связи с тем, что на тот момент в классических классификаторах им не выделяется отдельной рубрики, а статистические данные накапливаются и публикуются с учетом указанных классификаторов. В сфере услуг к Hi –Tech относят пять отраслей: современные виды связи, финансовые услуги, образование, здравоохранение и так называемые бизнес-услуги, которые включают разработку программного обеспечения, контрактные ИР, консультативные, маркетинговые и прочие услуги, используемые при организации и ведении бизнеса. Российский науковед А. И. Ракитов обращает внимание на, то, что составляющими любых технологий будут обязательно информация и знания. «Коль скоро речь идет о современных, особенно высоких технологиях, мы имеем дело с научными знаниями. Они могут составлять основу управленческих процедур, последовательностей и качества операций по изготовлению артефактов или услуг, являющихся конечным результатом технологической цепочки. Современные технологии изначально создаются на научной основе, а когнитивный компонент привносится в них из высокоразвитых научных дисциплин. В случае же высоких технологий,

[□] Наукоемкость – это показатель, отражающий степень связи технологии с научными исследованиями и разработками (ИР). Наукоемкость отрасли обычно измеряется как отношение затрат на ИР к объему сбыта, либо по показателю отношения к объему сбыта численности ученых, инженеров и техников, занятых в отрасли.

если измерять вес того или иного компонента в технологической системе финансовыми затратами, научная составляющая является одной из самых дорогих или даже максимально дорогостоящих. Таким образом, современные научные знания все чаще оказываются источником создания новых технологий. Вместе с тем современные технологии ставят перед наукой комплекс задач, не решаемых на уровне традиционных знаний. Это формирует задачное поле, или пространство, науки... Оно состоит в том, что происходит обоюдный процесс: быстрая технологизация наук, включая науки социально-гуманитарные, и вместе с тем "обнаучивание" технологий (1, с 135).

В современном социуме прослеживается возрастание роли науки в виду увеличения наукоемкости современных технологий, что делает необходимым изучение механизмов взаимосвязи научных исследований с развитием техники и технологий. Особо отметим, что сама наука переживает серьезные трансформации: изменяется организация науки, модифицируются способы и методы получения научного знания, меняются взаимоотношения науки и общества. Это привело к тому, что в конце XX века ряд западных ученых, даже заговорило о том, что бурное развитие высоких технологий может привести к «концу науки». Возьмем, для примера выступление Дж. Хорган, о том что, «наука далека от того, чтобы в ней все было истинно, она превращается в эзотерическое и фракционное предприятие, которое не дает логически увязанного взгляда на реальность. Эта тенденция прослеживается в книге под названием “Конец науки?” (The End of Science?), которая включает доклады, представленные на научной конференции, состоявшейся в 1989 г. в Колледже Густава Адольфуса в штате Миннесота. «Все больше и больше создается впечатление, что наука как единая, всеохватывающая и объективная форма общественного сознания закончила свое существование», — утверждают редакторы этого издания. Некоторые обозреватели опасаются, что нарастающий скептицизм наряду с увеличивающимися расходами на научные исследования может остановить ее прогрессивное развитие. Ни один из этих сценариев не оставляет больших надежд на будущее науки — по крайней мере науки в ее самом высоком понимании, т.е. той, которая служит познанию природы. Либо вера и целесообразность служения этой цели исчезает из-за того, что ученые убеждены, будто они уже получили все

окончательные ответы, либо сама наука свертывается под давлением политических и экономических сил (2, с.6-7). Вспомним, Т.Куна, который еще в 60-е годы XX века полагал, что наука в высшей степени субъективна, продолжая эти идеи американский ученый Вильчек «уподобляет нас пешкам на шахматной доске. Наша первейшая задача заключается в том, чтобы определить законы этой игры. Как только мы узнаем эти законы, сможем превратиться из пешек в игроков. В некотором смысле этот процесс уже начался: системы искусственного интеллекта, геновая инженерия и другие технологии — это наши первые шаги к тому, чтобы стать игроками. И если шахматы фактически имеют бесконечное число вариантов игры, то законы природы наверняка такие же. Наука поэтому бессмертна»(2).

Сегодня высокие технологии больше не просто вопрос объектов в руках людей; это стало очень сложной системой, в которую наши каждодневные жизни являются вложенными. В наше время можно констатировать факт, что наука и техника опять развиваются параллельно. Иногда мы сталкиваемся с тем, что современная техника сама способна развиваться и быть независимой от науки. В инновационном обществе XXI века мы все чаще встречаемся с фактами и примерами «отехниченной науки». В этом случае большинство научных разработок подчинено корпоративным запросам бизнеса. Большинство высоких технологий изготавливается под заказ производителей той или иной продукции.

В основе стратегической модели инновационного развития лежат разработки Hi-Tech технологий, производство на их основе высокотехнологичных товаров и услуг, выход с ними на мировые рынки и развертывание международной интеграции в научно-производственной сфере. Обладание Hi-Tech в условиях глобальной экономики становится не только фактором устойчивого развития, но и гарантом обеспечения национальной безопасности, отраженным в перечне критических технологий, определяющих приоритеты инновационно-технологического развития.

В современных условиях жизненный цикл высокотехнологичного продукта заметно сократился. Поэтому большинство предприятий постоянно находятся в поиске новых разработок и постоянных внедрений и выпуском новинок продукции. Главная задача компаний сводится к выбору нужных технологий из множества предлагаемых новинок. Так Б.Артур пишет:

«Высокие технологии, если заниматься ими на самом высоком уровне, - занятие не для робких. По сути, искусство игры за столиками "казино технологий" имеет отношение прежде всего к психологии. Есть и другие важные факторы - квалификация в технической области, наличие капитала, воля к победе и мужество, - но ни один из них не является определяющим. Как, правило, награды здесь достаются игрокам, способным раньше других распознать в окружающем технологическом тумане характер новых игр и постигнуть их смысл. Главная сила Гейтса - не в знании технологий, а в мастерстве предвидения, в умении различить образ очередной многообещающей игры» (3, с. 174). Как пишет Б.Юдин, «на поверхности всё вроде бы остаётся по-старому: провозглашается, что наука — это ведущая сила технологического прогресса, который, в свою очередь, использует её достижения. На этом фоне пробуждается осознание того, что так называемая прикладная наука занимается теми проблемами, которые диктуются именно развитием технологий, причём и по количественным масштабам, и по финансовому и иному обеспечению, и по социальному признанию такая "обслуживающая" наука становится определяющей. Целью научной деятельности оказывается не получение знания, так или иначе претендующего на истинность, а, получение эффекта, который может быть воплощён в пользующуюся спросом технологию» (4, с. 589).

В связи с выше перечисленным, в рамках взаимоотношений науки и высоких технологий вырабатываются особого рода отношения. По утверждению Хабермаса институт науки с самого начала своего формирования в своем основном каркасе держится на господстве над природой и господстве над человеком, которые в единстве составляют уникальный исторический проект, о котором впервые достаточно основательно заявляет Ф.Бэкон.

Общество уже сейчас, достаточно, настойчиво заявляет о необходимой революционизации этих взаимоотношений, а значит о формировании нового проекта науки. Этот новый проект предполагает наличие совершенно новой техники. «... когда рациональная форма науки и техники, т.е. воплощенная в системах целенаправленного действия рациональность, расширяется до жизненной формы, до «исторической тотальности» жизненного мира» (5, с. 63). Например, Хабермас выделяет два

уровня рациональности: первая, более низкая, когда происходит адаптация на производственном уровне, и вторая, более высокая, где наблюдается давление на науку. До XIX века процессы развития науки и техники не были взаимосвязаны и шли параллельно. Появление «наученной техники» характерно для XIX века. Именно с этого периода «...техника и наука становятся первостепенной производительной силой» (5, с.88). Надо заметить, что идеи, выдвинутые в этой работе, уже не столь актуальны, так как современная наука, давно изучает и исследует явления, которые часто недоступны для понимания обывателя, не включенного в процесс «производства» научных фактов.

В основе научной рациональности с точки зрения феноменологии заложен идеал познания вещи в объективной природе, т.е. такой, какой она есть «сама по себе». Осмысление социальной реальности человеком зависит от аксиологических установок заложенных в его мировосприятие, миропонимание и мировоззрение. Отсюда «объективное» «есть» и субъективное «должен» заложено в природе человека. Это как бы две диалектические стороны, холистского освоения мира человеком.

Так высокие технологии являются более комплексными в компаративном анализе с традиционными техниками. Однако Hi-Tech гораздо сильнее зависят от открытий и достижений в науке, чем традиционные. Например, «насыщение» социума продуктами информационных технологий неизбежно приводит к их «слиянию» с миром вещей.

В заключения можно сказать, что в пределах данной работы нам удалось сделать следующие выводы:

1. Hi-Tech— особая разновидность технологий, отраслей промышленности и изделий, которые получили название «наукоемких» или «высокотехнологичных» (high technology). Наукоемкость показателем, отражающим степень технологии связи с научными исследованиями и разработками (ИР). Наукоемкость отрасли обычно измеряется как отношение затрат на ИР к объему сбыта, или по показателю отношения к объему сбыта численности ученых, инженеров и техников, занятых в отрасли.

2. Высокие технологии поставили перед наукой задачи, которые уже невозможно решить в рамках традиционной науки, фактически это привело к складыванию поля науки, особенность которого в том, что происходит «обнаучивание технологий»
3. Суть научной деятельности сводится не к получению научных знаний, претендующих на истинность, а в получение научного эффекта, который может быть воплощен в зависимости от спроса на рынке высоких технологий
4. Особенность Hi-Tech в том, что они очень сильно зависят от открытий и достижений в науке, чем традиционные технологии.

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The Exodus saga

Petar Grujić

Abstract: The narrative of Hebrew exodus from Egypt is the central point of Old Testament in many respects. It is this episode, according to the traditional interpretation of Bible, which forged the Jewish nation and bestowed to Israelite a new monotheistic religion, transmitted by Moses. We consider some of the relevant aspects of the story, such as the historical veracity of the narrative, possible interpretations of the biblical text from within (exegesis) and allegorical reading of the Holy Scriptures. A number of alleged miracles described in Bible are discussed and recent interpretations via natural causes are presented. We dedicate some space to the very personality of Moses, as the most recent studies have been able to infer, as well as to the latest archaeological and anthropological research. Finally we discuss the contemporary political situation in the Middle East and its various repercussions on the interpretation of the biblical narrative.

Keywords: Exodus, religion, Moses, archaeology, miracles, allegory.

1. Prologue

That Bible is a remarkable piece of literary work has been generally acknowledged, both by believers and non-believers. In the western world its extraordinary status has been testified by the very title, for the Bible is a transliteration of the original Greek name *Ta Biblia* (Τα Βιβλία) meaning *The Books*. The plural refers to the original collections of various papyrus scrolls, which were used as sacred scriptures to be bound at various times into a single piece of book in the modern sense. That the common name book has been raised to The Book, testifies the unique meaning which this particular book has acquired in the West. Likewise, some common terms, like exodus (ἡ ἐξοδος - exit), diaspora (from διασπείρω - to scatter) etc have acquired special, unique significance when referring to Bible and have become Exodus, Diaspora etc, when referring to the Hebrew

mythology and history.⁵⁹ But the plural in the title is justified not only on the historical but on the textual grounds too. The content of Bible appears multi-layered, multi-genre, and multi-purpose, to such an extent that it turns out to be an encyclopedia (of Jews) rather than a standard literary work. The most frequently translated book in the world⁶⁰ contains so much material of various kind and historiographic value that it has provoked an enormous literary, religious, historical, anthropological and other sorts of examinations, that even numbering them would require a library of books and papers. The very terminology concerning investigations and interpretations of bible or parts of it acquires specific meaning, too. Examination (ἐξέγερσις) appears as a term almost exclusively in the form Exegesis, referring automatically to Bible.

What is now designated as the Old Testament (Jewish Bible) was initially written for Jews exclusively. By translating it into Greek (Septuagint) and especially with the appearance of the Christian movement, the Old Testament have been exposed to critical reading and scrutinized analysis. This change of the intellectual environment has resulted in undesirable examinations by those to whom the biblical narrative was not originally dedicated. This dichotomy of the tribal *versus* universal domain has proved nuisance to Jewish believers, but it was the price of making local believes universal religion.

Generally, all exegeses of Bible may be divided into two categories: (i) rational examinations (external approach) and (ii) religious studies (internal approach). The former may be termed scientific, the latter scholarly study. As the case with the relationship between the science and religion is generally, these two approaches have nothing in common, belonging to two essentially distinct sectors of human mental structures and activities, without a common section. Nevertheless in this article we shall make use of both approaches, treating the subject of the biblical narrative as the case study. In doing this we intend to expose both the present-day knowledge on this episode from the Old Covenant and the methodological difference between the external and internal approaches.

⁵⁹ So much that it has entered Microsoft software, as my Microsoft Word warns me whenever I write diaspora instead of Diaspora.

⁶⁰ Since these translations have been mainly commissioned by the Christian societies, like the Biblical society, this fact can not be taken as the sign of its popularity, even not of the significance relative to the other literary or other works.

Both approaches have their specific internal diversities in treating the subject. The internal studies (Exegesis) split into two distinct categories concerning the question how to interpret the biblical text: (i) literary or as (ii) allegorical message. Rational studies, on the other hand, cope with the problem of the material evidence concerning the biblical assertions about historical events and personalities. Both approaches appear time-dependent, depending on the historical instance at which the study is carried out. The real historical development in science and technology provides better and more complete inference into our past in general (but see, e.g. [1]), what surely influences the biblical studies. In the case of the rational approach new material evidence improves the analysis, whereas the internal approaches tend to adjust their interpretations to the new empirical and methodological evidences and advances, so as to provide better impression concerning the veracity of the narrative. In the latter case, the case in point are numerous attempts to explain various miracles described in Bible by rational, scientific means and generally natural causes. Though at first sight this should corroborate alleged veracity of the narrative, these attempts appear counterproductive, as we shall see in the particular instances later on. Any attempt to introduce rational means into the irrational realms must be destructive to the latter, by the very difference of nature of the subjects. Miracles, as supernatural phenomena, are quintessence of every religion and explaining them out results inevitably in wiping out the religious core of the narrative.

2. Exegesis and epistemology

Decoding non-historical narratives is like reading detective stories. Exegesis of Bible, like other exeges, employs a number of general methodological rules, helpful in disentangling possible from impossible, probable from improbable. In weighting a veracity of particular assertions, one must enquire as to the possible motives for inventing particular instance, like political, ideological and other eventual rationale. Another useful tool is the check if the particular construct belongs to the category of mythologame. If it turns out to be the case, it casts serious doubts concerning the veracity of the narrative. The case in point is Exodus, as even a causal reading of Bible testifies. As already noted by Freud, the very story about Moses birth and early life turns out to be a mythologame [2].

The most impressive episodes described in the Old Testament⁶¹ are those alternations of *esodus* (ἡ ἐσοδος/εἰσοδος - entrance) and *exodus* (ἡ ἐξοδος - exit). The series begins with Abraham's exodus from Mesopotamia [3], at Yahweh's suggestion (*lech lecha*), his *esodos* into Egypt and exodus from it, Joseph's (forced) *esodos* into Pharaoh's land and the subsequent exodus under Moses (Exodus) etc. Many of the later numbers of the events in the series were forced moves, including exiles and deportations, to be continued up to the modern times, from Hitler's Third Reich to the moves linked with the new Jewish state of Israel. The reasons for this Jewish mobility may be searched in their ancestral nomadic life, as well as in their racial/religious exclusivity.

Since the Exodus has been considered by Jews as instrumental for forging Jewish nation and Jewish religion too, the proper interpretation of the veracity of the biblical narrative and the meaning of the message of the story, appears of utmost importance. As we shall see later on the implications of the various interpretations for the modern history, in particular for the existence and nature of the State of Israel, can not be overestimated.

3. Exodus - between myth and history

As the entire Bible, Old and New Covenant alike, appears a mixture of historical events and non-historical inventions, and the case with the second book of the Pentateuch, ascribed to Moses, is no exception. The real question often posed before the exegetes is if there is some real historical core inside the mythic construct, the question posed whenever one reads any myth. Many events described in Bible are interpreted either as allegorical records of (pre)historical events or social states. Thus the famous Abraham's attempt to sacrifice his only son Jacob has been interpreted as referring to the passage from human to animal sacrifices.⁶² In the following we shall consider the narrative from a number of

⁶¹ The term Old (New) Covenant appears more appropriate and we shall often use it instead the standard one - Old (New) Testament.

⁶² Of course, this is not a unique interpretation and one may well paraphrase Höffding by saying that interpretations come and go and Bible remains.

possible aspects, without pretending to be neither exhaustive nor scrutinizing. We first outline the biblical narrative.

Jacob's son, Joseph, was sold by his brothers to Egyptians and brought as a slave to Pharaoh's land. He manages to ascend to a high position at the Pharaoh's court, thanks to his wit and a lucky prophesy. Afterwards his brothers arrive to Egypt and they settle down there, being forgiven and accepted by their influential brother. Their families become prosperous, they multiply and after a number of generations appear so numerous that Pharaoh starts fearing for his state in the presence of alien (sub) population. The latter feel suppressed and exploited and Moses, after a two-year sojourn among Medians at Sinai, has been instructed by Yahweh to plead Pharaoh to let Moses' people leave the country. After Pharaoh's many refusals, Moses leads his kinsmen across Red Sea, with the help of Yahweh and miraculously escapes the chase of Pharaoh. He then receives instructions from Yahweh, including 15 Commandments, and the prospects of the Promised Land. After many controversies with the people over the leadership etc, and after 40 years of wandering around in the (Sinai) desert, Moses brings the People⁶³ to the river Jordan and dies. He disappears into the mountain Nebo, leaving no trace of his grave, without entering the Promised Land, leaving this exploit to his aide Joshua.

3.1. Fairy tales and mythologemae

Out of all books of the Pentateuch the second one surely resembles the most a fairy tales, common to all people folklore on the globe. In particular, the first part, the sojourn in Egypt appears extraordinary naive and full with numerous miracles [3]. Neither of the latter turn out original or unique concerning the people folklore and we shall enumerate some of these miracles and comment briefly the most prominent ones in the next subsection. Here we consider some of the particular instances which do not belong to miracles and which do not appeal to the supernatural causes.

3.1.1. *Joseph's case*

⁶³ Note the use of capital initials from now on.

It appears a frequent case in the fairy tales folklore that somebody of a modest social origin rises from a humble to the highest position by miraculous (though not supernatural) luck. This is what one might call the serendipity mythologema. Usually the plot consists of a young man competing for the hand of princess. The case of Oedipus, more precisely that episode of his encounter with Sphinx and the subsequent marriage with the queen [4], belongs to the same mythologema. Even more interesting and intriguing case is that of Joseph ben Mathias, alias Joseph Flavius, whose life story resembles so much of that of biblical Joseph ben Jacob, that one can hardly believe to be authentic one. The more so in view that the only evidence of the story comes from the very Joseph Flavius [5]. It contains all necessary biblical motives: (i) initial captivity, (ii) prosperous prophecies, (iii) adoption by the adversary side and (iv) a prosperous position within the powerful state.

Though not belonging to the exact category of these mythologemae, many instance in the New Testament remind us to this “remake phenomena”. They are usually prefixed by the “micro-exegesis” in the form: so that the [Old Testament] prophecy is fulfilled. In fact some modern exegetes point to some Old Testament episodes as the announcements of Jesus Christ as the Messiah. As we shall see later on, these and similar instances make the New Testament almost nothing more but a remake of the Old Covenant. (The case in point is the slaughter of the newly born Hebrews at the Pharaoh’s command present in many fairy tales. It will be repeated in the case of Herod the Great and the birth of Jesus from Nazareth.⁶⁴)

The “miraculous” escape of the infant Moses from sharing the fate of the other Hebrew babies was less miraculous, if one looks at the mythology of other nations, including the folklore. The case in point is that of Oedipus, though formally an opposite case: he was the son of a king, adopted by a shepherd (to rise again to the highest position of a king and then to fall down to the bottom of the Greek ethos). In fact Greek mythology offers even better illustration of this mythologema: The very Zeus had to suffer by his birth Oedipus’ fate [4], except for the very end, when he was overthrown not by the common ethos, but by an alien god (Yahweh).

⁶⁴ What has resulted in an “unfortunate” error in estimating the exact year of Jesus’ birth.

That the alleged miracles before Hebrews escape from Egypt belongs more to the fairy tales category than to an elaborated mythology one encounters with Greeks, for example, is illustrated by the lack of coherency and compatibility with the overall biblical ideology, which will be shaped ultimately as a profound monotheistic faith. Pharaoh dreams 7 fat and 7 meager caws,⁶⁵ what Joseph interprets as a warning. Warning by whom? A god from the Egyptian Pantheon? One might be tempted to point towards Yahweh, as playing a game with Egyptians and Hebrews, but it would be hardly acceptable. The following instance corroborates another interpretation. It concerns the competition between Moses and Magicians, whom Pharaoh orders to counterattack the Moses' miraculous abilities to make snakes at will. Here we witness competition between a god (God) and another supernatural power (magic one). That the latter does not appear to be of divine nature should emphasize the august nature of the Hebrew protector, as opposite to the profane power of the Magicians. This point testifies that the rationale behind the story was not that of Yahweh playing a puppet play, but appears one of the rival adversaries of supernatural powers belonging to (other) nations, "nations" in the later parlance of the Holy Scriptures (*beathens*). These instances testify that at the time such episodes were construed the henotheism was still present among Hebrews.

3.1.2. To save the phenomena

Many attempts have been made to explain the seemingly supernatural or improbable events described in Bible. Usually natural laws are invoked so as to convince the skeptics or nonbelievers in the veracity of the biblical narratives. The most interesting and intriguing case is that of nonbelievers with scientific background who try to put the miracles under the cap of a scientific or at least rational cover. In both cases one wonders what the rationale of these attempts is. From the standpoint of religious exegetes reducing the miraculous events to the natural causes results in an unintentional pulling the carpet under the religious content of the holy books. Religion resides on the miracles, supernatural, otherwise

⁶⁵ Note the magic number 7 (as well as 12 and 40) which appears abundantly in fairy tales and Bible.

the faith becomes redundant and all what remains is the rational, natural, that is common and profane. Truly religious believer would never fall into this trap.

The case of nonbelievers⁶⁶ appears more interesting to us here, since they invoke scientific methodology and scrutiny, in explaining the miracles as possible and probable. The only mystery which remains to explain is the probability that a large number of possible, but rare or improbable events, arrange conveniently into a series described in Bible [6]. Thus the miraculous reduces to the improbable, pure chance. We know after the rise of Quantum mechanics that everything at the micro-level may be explained by the probability, but at the common level coincidences are rare. Miracles which repeat are no longer miracles. Of course, many phenomena observed in laboratory are considered miraculous or mysterious, like the famous double-slit experiment in physics, but this refers more to our inability to comprehend the subtle natural effects than to supernatural agencies. In fact, referring to possible but improbable makes the existence of supernatural beings, and thus of divine one, redundant.

Miracles in the Exodus narrative are numerous indeed, and we shall not dwell on them, except a few, for the sake of illustration. All those miracles may be divided into three groups, according to the place and time ascribed to them: (i) Egyptian, (ii) Sinaian and (iii) Palestinian.

(i) Egyptian miracles

We mentioned before one of them, those performed by Moses (with Yahweh's help) and by Pharaoh's Magicians. Then come those famous 10 plagues, inflicted on Egypt by Yahweh in order to convince Pharaoh's to grant Moses' demands and let Hebrews leave the country. (Why God himself did not "convince" the Pharaoh will become clear later, when the allotting of the hereditary priesthood to a particular tribe - that of Moses' Levities - would be on agenda.). Out of 10 plagues the most spectacular appears the 9th one, that of darkness. Two principal

⁶⁶ I avoid intentionally the term *atheist*, since it presupposes the notion of *theist*, which can not be a primitive construct. (otherwise a famous "ontological proof" of the existence of God would be assumed, albeit implicitly).

explanations of the sudden disappearance of the daylight have been offered. One is a trivial one, as an effect of *khamsin* (wind of the desert) [3], not uncommon in Egypt, followed by darkness. The other interpretation appears much bolder, by invoking celestial phenomena. According to an author this extraordinary event refers to the Sun eclipse, which took place in Egypt in 1335 BC [3]. It explains, accordingly, why the narrow region in Delta, inhabited by Hebrews, was spared of the darkness. Accidentally, this dating should provide the time of Exodus. The problem is that traditionally dating puts the Exodus during the reign of Ramses II (1279-1213 BC).

(Incidentally, if there is any historical truth in the Biblical narrative, this extraordinary event coincided approximately with another remarkable happening across the eastern Mediterranean, that of Trojan war (1184 BC). Both events happened to be recorded in writing at about the same time, 7th c. BC [7], and both played remarkable roles in the history of Israelites and Greeks, respectively. In both narratives gods interfere with the human affairs, but while Greeks did not take it seriously [8], Hebrews did.)

The most spectacular miracle has been, of course, that of "crossing" Red Sea. Many possible explanations have been offered to "save the phenomenon". We mention a few of them. One of them is not in fact an explanation of the alleged event, but rather linguistic interpretation of the relevant text in Bible. It refers to the similarity of terms "sea" and "reed" in Hebrew. Thus crossing the sea has been read as passing through reed field, what appears considerably less dangerous and more acceptable. But if one reads Bible literary, she must invoke considerable amount of natural forces so as to provide a reasonable explanation. One attempt has relied on the power of the wind in the area [6], which would blow away the shore water for a limited time, so as to allow Yahweh's people to pass by the solid soil. With a convenient bottom configuration arrangement could be made even that water remains on both sides of the escapees, thus putting solid confidence in the Bible narrative. A less spectacular model has been made by calling for the ordinary tide effect. When the water withdraws Hebrews pass by the dry soil, and the naïve and stupid Pharaoh runs flatly into the deadly trap. In fact, talking about probability (theory) one might envisage the case of all water molecules arrange according the Biblical requirements by themselves, what is not prohibited by the atomic theory of matter. (Interestingly, a similar episode was experienced by Alexander, leading his

army between mount Climax and Pamphilian Sea, as quoted also by Josephus [9] 2.16.5.)

(ii) *Desert wandering*

Miracles during the 40 years wandering in Sinai appear in abundance too. We quote some of them (see, e.g. [6] for a more detailed description and interpretation).

On the occasion of an acute thirst of Hebrews under the hot sun of the Sinai desert, Yahweh says to Moses to strike a rock and the water will flow to extinguish the thirst. Moses does it and the water flows out of the rock. One of the explanations has been that the miracle was not a miracle at all and that there are porous rocks in deserts, covered with an impervious crust, preventing rainwater to evaporate from inside. With a strong blow Moses might have opened the rock to supply his people with necessary potable water. This appears a reasonable explanation, were it not for the quantitative estimate. According to Bible, there were about 600.000. people to drink, what would require not a rock, but an ilk of Rocky Mountains.

The Bible provides also a guide to Hebrews on their way to the Mount Sinai, in the form of a pillar, which took the shape of a cloud by day and, conveniently, of fire during the night, so that Israelites were able to move day and night toward their goal. Such pillars are regularly supplied, according to some exegetes, by volcanoes. Colin Humphries identifies the necessary volcano with the very Mount Sinai [6].⁶⁷

The famous episode with *manna* has been explained in a number of ways. In the Bible it was a staff sent by Yahweh to feed the Israelites in a sandwich form. First there was morning dew, then manna over that and again the dew. The etymology of the term appears uncertain. According to some authors, it referred to some staff Israelites ate in Egypt, called *man*. On the other hand the same name was given by Arabs to “a sweet, sticky, honey-like juice, exuding in heavy drops in May and June, from a shrub found in the Sinai peninsula” [3]. The modern explanation has been that manna refers to lichen, which appears endemic in some Middle-East

⁶⁷ The attentive reader will recognize this mythologema in the case of the famous Star of Bethlehem, which guided the Magers towards the place where Jesus was born.

countries. Accordingly, these lichens were lifted by the wind into air and then dropped down near the Israelite camp. The miraculous aspect appears again concerning the quantitative side of the Yahweh's bread offered to Israelites. (The famous New Testament miracle of Jesus feeding the crowd of 5.000 with three fishes comes to mind immediately).

Finally, we mention the sound of trumpet coming down from Mount Sinai, according to Bible. An explanation has been offered in the form of volcano effect [6]. Namely, it is been observed that gases from the volcano interior may pass through the cracks of the hot eruptive surrounding, producing a blast similar to trumpet sound. According to the Roman historian Dio Cassius, as noted by Humphreys [6], the very Vesuvius used to produce such a sound during its famous eruption in 79 AD. (Which god announced thus his presence in that particular instance was not specified, but one may comfortably take him for Hephaestus.)

(iii) Palestinian miracles

We mention first the miracle of Moses death, which should be dubbed pre-Palestinian, since Israeli lawgiver died at the threshold of the Promised Land, disappearing first into unknown part of the mountain Nebo. That he was able to describe his own death in the Fifth Moses' book of the Pentateuch appears miraculous exploit indeed. But the most grandiose miracle surely was the stopping the Sun travel across the sky, at the Joshua's demand, so that he be given the time to beat his Palestinian enemy. If the Red Sea crossing was of a geological significance, the standing still of Sun must be surely considered of a cosmological dimension. But before we enter the speculative sphere, let us first comment how the ancient scribe(s) arrive at the idea of manipulating the celestial objects.

That the Ancients subscribed to the evident Geocentric Cosmos is a surprise by no means and Israelites were no exception on the matter.⁶⁸ To stop a disk of the size of Moon was not considered an impossible task for the God, who created Sun for the benefit of mankind anyway. That the effect of this intervention would be perceived by other people on Earth and thus recorded did not bother the

⁶⁸ See, however, I. Liritzis and A. Coucouzeli, *J. Astronom. History and Heritage*, 11/1 (2008) 39-49. for the account of the Heliocentric model of the planetary system in the ancient Hellada.

Bible authors, proving once again that this episode belongs to the realm of fairy tails. Had the biblical authors known that the Sun was infinitely more massive than Earth and that the apparent motion of the celestial sphere was due to the rotation of Earth around her own axis, they surely would not venture to stop the Sun, even for the sake of such an extraordinary purpose. This instance illustrates well the risk of relying on the apparent phenomena from one side and on the scientific knowledge on the other. Science makes mistakes,⁶⁹ thanks Zeus, and direct empirical evidence may be delusive, as astronomers found for their misfortune. Physically, to stop the Sun would reduce to stop Earth revolving around her axis, what would have been noticed by other creatures on Earth even in a more direct and disastrous way than just by observing Sun standstill on the Sky. But that referring to the scientific interpretation of the celestial phenomena may be even more risky testifies the famous case of Galileo, who attempted to defend Copernicus' heliocentric model by reinterpreting the biblical text [10]. Galileo most probably referred to Ptolemaic Premium Mobile, the outmost sphere which spins all other spheres, better to say interpreted Joshua's demand to stop it, what have resulted in stopping all other celestial spheres, including Earth. That would prolong the day, as requested. Galileo was aware of the rotation of Sun and felt that the Sun's motion was somehow linked with the planetary dynamics. The later provided, albeit in an implicit manner, another indication that the Sun was the central player in the planetary system. No doubt it was this venture into biblical exegesis which made Catholic Church furious about the old astronomer.

3.2 The history

We now pass to the rational sphere and examine the available evidence of the alleged biblical event. What the historical facts have to say about Exodus. The answer is short – almost nothing. This fact does not invalidate the core of the biblical narrative, which states that at some time a group of people, to be later called Israelites, moved from Egypt into the Palestine. The history simple can not provide evidence for this assertion.

⁶⁹ That's how it evolves.

3.2.1 Historical evidence

Is the whole story a fairly tale, the myth or a reminiscence, albeit in a distorted form, of a real event? We notice first that not only the name of Pharaoh was never mentioned in the narrative, but even the time of the event can not be placed onto the historical time axis with better precision than 3 centuries. The suggestion that it was Ramses II who reigned the Egypt at the time contradicts two hard facts: (i) Ramses II was one of the most experienced and capable pharaoh in the entire Egyptian history. (ii) He certainly did not perish under the waves of Red Sea. As for his successor, Meremtah, two points must be made here: (i) It was during his rule that Hebrew name was mentioned in a written form (albeit in a somewhat different form), for the first time in history, (ii) No written or other record of the event was made, in otherwise highly civilized and bureaucratic state.

One millennium after the alleged event, an Egyptian priest and scholar, Manethon, wrote the history of Egypt, after the request of the Ptolemy I. He did mention a variant of the Exodus, but it was so much politically charged, that it can be hardly taken as an impartial account According to Manethon, those Hebrews were not a nation, or people in the modern sense, but Egyptians suffering from leprosy, whom Pharaoh banished from his country for the prophylactic reasons. In order to appreciate this kind of explanation one has to account for the tension existing in Alexandria at the Manethon's time between Jews from one side and Egyptians and Greeks from the other. The latter looked down Jewish claims for their antiquity and the superiority of their lawgiver Moses over his counterparts in other nations in a derisory manner [11]. The tension took on a serious form around the beginning of Common Era, that Greek and Jewish delegations went to Rome (39/40 AD) to settle the dispute before the Emperor Caligula [9], with the latter delegation lead by Philo Judaeus and Greek by Flavius' archenemy grammarian Apion.

3.2.2 Archaeological research

Since the newly established state of Israel has been controlling the Palestine soil, the latter has become the object of extensive archeological investigations, unprecedented in history. The entire region has become virtually an archeological

site and almost every square meter has been examined [7], [12]. The reasons for these activities appear the same as those motives for reestablishing Jewish state. In a sense, the entire Zionist story may be put under the heading of “syndrome of eternal return “ in Eliade’s sense [13]. Extensive investigations of the Sinai peninsular have not revealed a presence of a population of 600.000 Israelites (or of even a substantially smaller number), in the period of Recent Bronze age, where the alleged exodus was situated by the Biblical authors. We notice here that numerous findings in the area were excavated which belong to the previous or posterior periods. In particular, the town Cades-Barnea mentioned in Bible has been identified, but as a place founded in VII BC. It was here, according to Bible, that Israelites spent 38 years out of the 40 years of wandering in the Sinai desert. Generally, many places from the Exodus narrative have been identified, but belonging to much later periods, mainly in VII c. BC, when, under the Josiah (639-609) the main body of the Holy Scriptures, have been composed.

Equally, biblical nations Moabites, Edomites and Ammonites, at the time ascribed to Exodus, were nomadic groups, who established small kingdoms much later, again around VII c. BC. The extensive public works, carried out under pharaohs Psammetic I (664-610) and Neko II (610–595) BC found presumably their place in the narrative of Exodus, under the heading of “slavery works”.

That the situation present at the time of writing down (or the oral tradition) is usually pushed back into remote past is no surprise to scholars dealing with the prehistory. It happened to Homer too, who describes royal palaces that have never existed during the Trojan War, but have been excavated in many places in Greece, dating from Homer’s time (c. VIII BC), so-called *megarons* [14]. Though known under the same name, they differed in the architectonic structure, just as the Romanic and gothic cathedrals differ in many respects.

3.3 Hypotheses

In the absence of hard historical records, many hypothetical solutions of the Exodus riddle have been offered. We mention here two of the most interesting (or intriguing) suggestions.

3.3.1. Freud’s reconstruction

In his last testimonial book [2] farther of the psychoanalysis made an elaborate and mostly suggestive reconstruction of the possible events which might have lied behind the biblical narrative. According to him Moses was a high priest of the recently established Akhenaton's monotheistic religion. After the death of the Pharaoh, who regarded himself earthly representative of the unique god (the God) Aton, who manifested himself via the Sun, the new revolutionary religion perished and Moses escapes the revenge of the clergy by fleeing into Sinai desert, leading with him those who still adhered to the rebellious pharaoh's new faith. Further narrative follows rather closely New Testament plot, *mutatis mutandis*, in the "remembering the future" sense. Moses was stoned by disobeying, rebellious followers. This ritual murder resulted in a tremendous collective trauma of Israelites, that as a mean of repentance they subsequently prescribed to themselves so much restrictive and strict religious rules, unprecedented in previous history. As is well known Freud was very reluctant concerning religion, describing it as *obsessive neurosis*, and the exegesis he proposed was aimed at relieving Jews from their religious chains. In a sense he put the whole nation on his psychiatric coach. The thesis that Moses was not a Jew but Egyptian was aimed at the Jewish racial exclusivity, with obvious motivation. The general ideological background of the claim was an attempt to divorce Jewishness from Mosaic religion, more precisely from a religion as such. This will be the standing of many European members of the Jewish population, *y compris* Albert Einstein.

The Egyptian origin of the Hebrew lawgiver has been indicated by a number of instances found in the biblical narrative, as the case is with Moses complaining to Yahweh for his "hard tongue" while trying to avoid negotiations with Pharaoh.⁷⁰ Another instance, though much less conclusive, is Moses' arguing for abolition of circumcision among his followers, the custom obviously brought along from Egypt.

3.3.2. Historic Moses

⁷⁰ The claim that this handicap was related to Moses' two-year absence from his people, during the stay with Medians [3], does not appear convincing.

The entire narrative of Exodus revolves around the personality of Moses. Not only he appears the key player, but by resolving his true identity one may hope to solve the Exodus riddle too. The historical person who resembles the most the biblical Jewish leader was the Egyptian chancellor Beya [15]. He was of Asiatic origin (whose Egyptian name contains the suffix Moses) and after the death of Sethi II and with the pharaoh's widow Taousert bring on the throne Siptah, son of Sethi II and a prince Canaanite. The child dies soon and Taousert ascends herself on the throne. This stirs a violent opposition from the conservative party, lead by another pretender Sethnakht. The civil war ensues and Beya and Taousert organize a Canaanite army, probably constituted from Shosous and Habirous.⁷¹ They plunder the treasures of their adversaries, what might correspond to famous Jewish acquisition of golden and silver staff from their Egyptian neighbours, described in Bible [3] (see, also [11] on that point).

But Sethnakht defeated Canaanites in 1186 BC and the latter fled towards East and were never caught. The problem with linking Beya with Moses is that Israel was already established in Palestine before Beya arrived. This, however, does not preclude the arrival of a group from Egypt, bringing some new customs and concepts, including that of a unique god, Yahweh. The custom of circumcision might have been imported by the same occasion. That an attempt to abolish the ritual was ascribed to Moses should not surprise us, for the authority of the lawgiver was presumably used for imposing rules, though he probably never played the role ascribed to him, or even ever existed.

4. Exodus as allegory

In XIII c. AD Dante described his extraordinary journey though the Hell, Purgatory and finally Paradise [16]. Dante was a historical person and all people he met there were known to history, except devils and angels. Yet nobody took his narrative seriously. Why? In the absence of any empirical evidence, his contemporaries, as well as the posterior generations, conceived the narrative as an allegory, describing the gradual purification of the human soul, ascending from the lowest (Hell) to the most august (Paradise) levels.

⁷¹ Most probably these semi-nomads Asiatic were the ancestors of the Hebrews.

We have seen that neither of interpretations discussed above fits the Exodus narrative. The question arises then why this Biblical episode was written at all. But if one adopts the allegorical interpretation, as the red thread passing through the labyrinth of personalities, realistic or fictive, data, places, events (possible and/or improbable), through the narrative going from the spiritual depths to the fairy tale level, the entire ideology lying behind the perplexing content becomes understandable. In fact, the entire myth appears a metaphor for emergence, purification and finally awarding of Israelites by Yahweh. The story turns out even more elaborate than one might imagine at the first reading. Not only it is Yahweh who leads and protects his chosen people, it is the very Israelite god (the God) who has emerged from the narrative. Thus Exodus fulfils all requirements for an almost axiomatic, self-sufficient (religious) system.

The division, parallel to Dante's one, appears clear. The Hell is played by Egypt, where Israelites were forced to mix with Egyptians, as impure race. The initial episode of fleeing from Egypt was thus the first stage of purification, as a birth of ethically perfect and ethnically pure nation. The passage through Red Sea makes this allegory even more conspicuous, even banal: splitting the sea appears a metaphor for passing from the womb through vagina into the real, unfriendly world. This episode appears a remake of the banishment from Eden. Sinai wandering was obviously the Purgatory, where the suffering was a severe test for Israelite obedience before the newly acquainted, albeit indirectly, God. The collective suffering was devised to tempt the Israelites and ensure they have adopted the new religion. The span of 40 years of wandering before entering the Promised Land (Canaan) was not chosen by chance. After two generations, nobody born in the land of slavery (Egypt) was supposed to give birth of Israelite child, who will be thus cut off from an "impure nation".⁷² The entire Sinai episode resembles much the rite of initiation, as practised by many esoteric societies [17].

(The Red Sea passage might as well be interpreted as a metaphorical purification by water, as indicated by the Yom Kippur ritual washing. The final stage of the ritual would be crossing Jordan river, while passing to the Promised

⁷² The logic resembles much the Gnostic ideology, though the latter was pushed to its utmost extremes.

Land. Jordan water was particularly convenient for this kind of ritual, as the New Testament authors found too.)

Moses' encounter with Yahweh on the Sinai Mountain appears another allegorical mythologema, which helps the authors to transfer their ideas to the readership or audience, as stemming from divine or other august sources. Greek poetry, both oral and written was full of Muses, whom the authors invoked for inspiration, but the later might well be considered as the primary source of information on the subject. When Parmenides refers to a goddess as the teacher of the true nature of the world [18], he relies much on the archetypal aspects of the minds of his contemporaries, what should have ensured a proper response of his readers.

Moses was conceived as a counterpart of Greek Homer. His experience with divine presence will be repeated many times on various occasions in the Near-East and European history, as the case with Mahomet illustrates. Sinai-wandering temptation will be paralleled by Jesus' encounter with Devil in desert, with the difference that it happened after the Holy Spirit descended onto him, while in the Sinai-wandering episode it was a prerequisite to entering the Promised Land, an Earthly equivalent of Eden.

5. Exegesis and meta-Exegesis

As a scrutinised analysis of the Bible reveals that many parts of the Old Testament were composed in the periods of difficult time for the Hebrew nation, when its very existence was felt endangered. Usually, it refers to the periods of enslavements or immediately after returning home after exiles [7], [12]. The principal part was written during Josiah's reign, when the crypto-polytheism was gaining power in Judea and the Israel on the north was going to lose its exclusively racial substrate [12]. The story about Chosen people and strict obedience to the tribal god Yahweh was contrived as a countermeasure to the danger of dissolution of the Hebrew nation. But the Exodus narrative brought into the story an inadvertent new inconvenient element. It raised the question of the Jews in Palestine as an autochthonous population. In view of the current political situation with the state of Israel the question puts a considerable burden on the Jewish claims on the Palestine territory. Hence, the modern Exegesis from the side of Jewish

scholars, both from Israel and otherwise, must be subjected to additional examination, to ensure that non-scientific motivations do not interfere with the pure rational or historical exegesis. This meta-exegesis should be practised whenever historical claims may be used in favour of the current political needs or claims. In fact, such meta-exegeses have been practised extensively in connection with much contemporary political turmoil, as the case of the current Balkan affairs shows.

But besides the Zionist ideology, the reinterpretation of the Biblical narrative of Exodus bears much more profound implications concerning the very essence of the Judaism. Discarding the veracity of the narrative, one inevitably renounces the historicity of the biblical Moses, better to say his role of the lawgiver. But since the latter has been relied on his alleged connection with Yahweh, Jewish god (the God), it implies renouncing the Torah, the Law, the Jewish religion. This move has not appeared unique to denying Exodus, but has been present in a number of attempts in modern time to disentangle Judaism from the biblical religion in general. More generally, from the religion as such and to retain the racial core of the Hebrews as the essence of the nation. This line of emancipation of the Jews from the religious will be noticed, *mutatis mutandis*, watching some of the most prominent Jews in the last couple of centuries. We mention here Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein, who all discarded the biblical tradition, on different grounds, of course, as far as its religious content and intention have been regarded. Marx argued that Jewish religion was alien to their mentality and cultural background, whereas Freud stressed that Yahweh was alien to their nation. Finally Einstein maintained that religion in general, and Biblical one in particular, was alien to common sense and rational thinking. Thus, "Jewishness" has been redefined as a purely biological entity, independent from any cultural, historical or other conditions. The rationale for this emancipation can be analysed within the post-Renaissance Europe, but it would go beyond the scope of this article. In an ironical sense, it appears, according to these European intellectuals, that Hebrews appear a "Chosen People" indeed, but not as a bearers of God's message, but as a tool of emancipation of mankind from the religious bounds. A remarkable turn of a "World mission" indeed. In a sense this emancipation from the Religion may be considered as another aspect of the meta-Exodus.

6. Epilogue

Creation of a myth has its history, as the interpretation of the narrative has too. In the case of Biblical narratives, which usually mix fictions with historical reality, one encounters an additional aspect of the exegesis – the actual political use of the canonised myths. Here we meet the syndrome of the historicisation of mythology, what is often paralleled by mythologization of history. The saga of exodus represents an example *par excellence* of both aspects of interpretation of religious messages, what sometimes amount to doing detective job. Apart from the archaeological (lack) of evidence, no further records or information are to be expected concerning this particular part of the Bible.

We do not pretend to be either definite or exhaustive on the subject, but offer a number of plausible interpretations of this central narrative of the Holy Scriptures. We have found two principal points to be made: the political motivation for inventing the story in the time of Josiah (historization of the myth), as noticed by other authors [12] and current political needs to stress the nonhistoricity of the invention (demythologization of the history [12]). Finally, we offer an interpretation which goes beyond historiography, the allegorical interpretation, which fits well the general aspects of any religious teaching concerned with ethos, as the fundamental organizing force of the society.

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